The Fate of Kurds in New Iraq
said that the new Iraqi national government that have been so fragile
and unstable outside of American protection finally receive a true
chance to prove itself as a competent and independent entity capable
of maintain stability in and effectively govern Iraq. Yet, to much of
the world, the scenes in Iraq have hardly changed since that day
President Bush announced the end of all major combat operations:
American soldiers patrolling streets of Baghdad, workers constructing
new oil pipelines and new buildings, and natives complaining about
continuing American occupation.
However, one thing changed significantly for the commoners of Iraq, in
days before and after, major cities of Iraq including Baghdad and
Mosul faced numerous terrorist attacks in which car bombs exploded on
busy streets, insurgents actively engaged new Iraqi security forces in
the streets and police stations while others sabotaged freshly
repaired oil pipelines. Among more than 400 dead, more than 30 troops
belonging to the Iraqi security force were killed while only 3 U.S.
soldiers are dead.
Yet, the attacks themselves foreshadow something much more important
to the future of Iraq, the fact that although many Kurdish politicians
decided to participate in the new Iraqi government by declaration of
joining the mainstream politics, no one can determine where does the
Kurdish race belong in the Iraqi society or in the world. However, it
is certain that the Kurdish society are quite organized, and its
leaders have easy access to weapons, American support, and have the
influence to attract certain amount of attention in the democratic
Iraq, just like the Arab Sunni minority. Why does Iraqis what to do
with the Kurds in their newly reborn nation? Why do they want to kill
the Kurdish men, women, and children? What should the U.S. and the
world do with the Kurds?
The Kurds have always been ruled by foreigners in history, their
homeland, from the beginning of time, have been integral part of the
greatest empires, such as those of the Persians, Alexander the Great,
the Romans, and the Arabs. However, their fate took a further downturn
after the First World War. With the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and
the immediate appearance of a power vacuum in the Middle East, the
British and French formed mandates of Iraq, Syria, and created the new
republic of Turkey and Iran, dividing the ancient home the Kurds,
Kurdistan, among new states and splitting families apart. After the
Baathists under Saddam Hussein launched a successful coup d'etat
against the puppet Sunni monarchy in the 1970's, life became worse for
the Kurds.
After launching unsuccessful revolts against the Saddam regime, the
Kurds suffered from Saddam's genocide against them, using conventional
weapons such as military helicopters and chemical weapons. It is not
difficult to understand why the U.S. picked the Kurds to be its number
one ally in Iraq. They are eager to fight: after decades of
persecution and restriction (such as limitation in education and
employment) under Saddam, they have been waiting for support against
him. And they are loyal: in exchange for their allegiance to the U.S.,
the Kurds would finally be able to receive autonomy from the Arabs.
But as the new Iraq state is created, the Kurds seems to be
marginalized, their rights overlooked as the war between the
government at Baghdad and the insurgents rages on. Some of the
decisions by the U.S. and interim government to give birth to the new
democracy as soon as possible have been particularly worrisome.
To many Americans, the transfer of power is something of joy and
relief. To them, the transfer symbolizes one step closer to the
long-waited (and the only still valid) goal of the Bush Administration
for the Iraqi invasion: creation of the first democracy in Iraq. And
this goal seems to be just in sight. The new Iraqi interim government
has already promised to hold national elections no later than the
beginning of the next year. However, the news of the upcoming birth of
democracy in Iraq also gave the Kurds of Iraq something to worry
about.
The new elected leaders of Iraq, no matter Shi'ite or Sunni, will try
their best at regaining the national prestige after a year of foreign
domination and instability. One of the most important ways of
regaining such prestige will be the preservation of a united Iraq.
Although the Kurds have achieved self-government within Iraq with the
help of the U.S. government, the Iraqi government will make that the
public understands that the Kurds and the region they control are
still part of Iraq. To do so, the Iraqi government will attempt to
assert themselves in the Kurdish region politically by intervening on
the Kurdish domestic matters by using excuse such as saying that it is
fighting for the rights of the Iraqis in Kurdish region.
Even if the U.S. will protect the Kurds from Arab political
encroachment, there are many reasons why the influence of Arabs in the
Kurdish region will not decline. One is the economic survival of the
Kurdish region depends on the Arabs. The main income of the region
will be the production of crude oil from its many large oil fields. In
the days of the Saddam regime, such oil fields are mainly manned by
Arab skilled labor. But now, due to the lack of education of its
common people, it is impossible for the Kurds can completely take over
the production of these oil fields. It is likely that the important
positions in the oil mining industry will continue to be occupied by
trained Arabs who had been doing the job for Saddam.
The second is that the cultural life of the Kurds will be highly
influenced by Arabs. Again, due to the lack of education, the new
public education system of the Kurdish region will be taught by Arabs
and the people will be watching mostly TV channels and programs of
Arabs because the Kurds cannot setup their own. The Arab view of the
world and Iraq will influence the way Kurds think and act. While
forcing many in Kurdistan to conform to Arab viewpoints, such a
phenomenon may also have the effect of pushing a small minority of the
native population to radical nationalism. Kurdish independence
through violence, they feel, would be the only suitable way to prevent
their countrymen from being steadily culturally assimilated by the
Arabs.
And lastly, there is a substantial Arab population in the Kurdish
region. In ruling the region, the Kurdish leaders cannot ignore the
demands of these people since these Arabs would be highly educated,
influential, and wealthy from holding important positions in the
Kurdish region (such as working in the oil field or teaching, as
discussed above). Furthermore, although the Kurds have a voice in the
decisions on the Iraqi foreign policy, there are still in minority
compared to the Arabs. So it is clear that even as the Kurds achieve
their autonomy in Northern Iraq, they will continue to be influenced
by their most powerful and wealthy neighbor in the South.
Of course, no matter how disturbed their lives had been due to foreign
occupation or influence, the Kurds always pushed for one goal, the
restoration of their ancient homeland, Kurdistan. Despite the
importance of self-rule to the Kurds, it is evident that they do not
think it is enough. They understand that they are still vulnerable to
Arab influence, and to throw off such influence, the only possible
method is to declare independence from Iraq itself and create the
nation of Kurdistan, where both the leaders and the general population
is entirely Kurdish.
The Kurdish leaders feel that within decades, if not few years, the
factors allowing the Kurdish independence will mature: 1) the Kurds
will master the art of oil mining from the Arabs; 2) the Kurdish
leaders will gain enough political experience to maneuver
diplomatically against external forces that oppose Kurdish
independence; 3) the Kurds will have earn enough cash to create a
military force that can successfully face off against foreign
invasions after the independence; 4) the cash from oil will also allow
the Kurds to train all kinds of professionals with foreign assistance.
These professionals will let the Kurds continue their daily lives
after the independence.
But even as the Kurds see a new hope of finally freeing themselves of
Arab rule, it is unlikely that this hope of independence will be
fulfilled in the near future. According to the Kurds as well as
historians, the original homeland of the Kurds includes the territory
of modern northern Iraq, northwestern Iran, southeastern Turkey, and
eastern Syria. If the Kurds declares independence, it will not only
provoke the current Iraqi interim government, it will also enrage the
national leaders of Iran, Syria, and Turkey. The inhabitants of these
nations have always considered the Kurdish region within their
territory inseparable part of their nations. The leaders of these
nations, with support from the people and a justifiable reason, will
invade Kurdistan immediately after the independence. Even if the
Kurdish military can fight off the initial invasions of its neighbors,
ultimately, it will not gain independence. There are few reasons.
One, the Kurds will lose their economic self-sufficiency from complete
independence. The backbone of the Kurdish economy is the exportation
of oil, but for or any oil or other commodity the Kurds produce to be
exported, they have to go through Arab or Turkish territory, simply
because the Kurdish territory doesn't border seas and all of its oil
pipelines and the roads lead to and Iraq and Turkey. It is almost a
guarantee that the nations bordering Kurdistan will launch economic
sanctions, cutting off Kurdish oil pipelines and its main source of
income. Perhaps the only way to prevent such an outcome would be for
the Kurdish to ally with the Shiites and their Iranian backers and
thereby gain access to Iranian seaports. But that move will
undoubtedly cause more economic difficulty under the current situation
as the Kurds lose access to main markets in the US and its allies due
to sanctions.
Secondly, while its neighbors can reorganize their forces and
replenish their arsenals and manpower, Kurdistan, with war casualties
and small population in comparison to any of its neighbors, will find
extremely difficult to steadily maintain a battle-ready force that can
defend its people and territory in a continuous basis. Even as the
Kurds celebrates their initial victory, they will find their hope of
the ultimate victory diminish as the war prolongs, because with each
battle, the Kurdish army shrinks in size, yet its enemies are
virtually unaffected. Also, the Kurds will be force to constantly
divide their limited forces to two fronts, one facing Iraq and another
facing Turkey, farther weakening its chances for ultimate military
victory.
And lastly, the lack of participation of Kurdistan in the
international affairs as compared to the high international status
enjoyed by it enemies, especially Turkey, a NATO member, and Iraq, a
democracy and American ally, will eventually cost the Kurds their
share of support in the international community. Many nations,
without any knowledge of the Kurdish situation, will give their
attention to anti-Kurd propagandas of Turkey and Iraq, thereby
becoming increasingly hostile to Kurdistan, including U.S., one of the
main supporters of the Kurdish self-rule. As stated before, the only
way for Kurdistan to avoid complete economic and military disaster,
namely, to ally itself with Iran, would only further deteriorate its
position in the international diplomatic community.
How does the U.S. respond to the Kurdish nationalism? It can be said
that from day one of the U.S. involvement in Iraq, the Kurds have been
used by the U.S. government as nothing more than a convenient tool
against the rule of Saddam Hussein. After the fall of Saddam, it had
given the Kurds autonomy through appreciation for their help in the
struggle against the Baathists and out of the sympathy of their
suffering during the Saddam regime, but mainly the reason was for the
Kurds not to be politically suppressed by the will of the Arab
majority in the new Iraqi democracy. However, the U.S. will not
support any independence movement of the Kurds for three reasons.
First of all, the U.S.'s permission to separation of Kurdish territory
through independence will only fuel hatred toward the Americans by the
general Arab population of Iraq and increase the frequency of attacks
on Americans by the Arab extremists and terrorists within the nation.
Such acts will only bring Iraq one step closer toward slipping into
complete chaos and bring anti-war sentiments to the headlines in U.S.
once more.
Second, Turkey has been a member of NATO for many years, and has
supported the U.S. on many occasions even though the support of
Ankara's membership has not been prevalent among its people (as seen
by the demonstration at the NATO meeting in Istanbul), the Bush
Administration doesn't want to lose an important ally in the region
over the Kurdish problem. Finally, if war starts between the newly
independent Kurdistan and its neighbors, Iran and Syria, two of the
nations listed on the top of the "Axis of Evil", will receive some
badly-needed military assistance through cooperation with Iraq and
Turkey, both armed with many advanced Western-produced weapons. It is
not in the interest of the U.S. to see Iran and Syria become stronger
in any way.
How will the Kurds spend their lives in their corner of the new Iraq?
The answer will be mostly heart-warming. For one thing, the Kurds will
no longer worry about their own safety in Iraq as long as the U.S.
government keeps an eye on the new Iraqi authority. Next, the Kurds
can now receive equal education, equal chance at employment as the
Arabs, and basic rights such as freedom of speech and assembly. After
all, the Bush Administration cannot afford to be criticized during
such a strategic time for crimes in the democratic Iraq like the
violation of human rights.
But above all, the Kurds now have the right to determine for
themselves how to live and how to govern their land, something utterly
unthinkable under Saddam. However, to many Kurds, their new lives will
also be disappointing. Dreams of the Kurds to completely break away
from Arab influence will not come true. Their powerful neighbor will
decide how the Kurds will be perceived internationally and will be a
key to their economic survival. Even as it supported the Kurdish
self-government, the U.S. will not support the Kurdish independence.
In conclusion, it can be seen that from now on, the Kurds will be a
small group of constituents within an Arab-dominated region. Do not
expect anybody to change this.
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