After looking at the ongoing boat row as a financial damage to Japan and as a personal experience of getting negative treatments in Japan, it is perhaps necessary to look at the whole reason why border disputes between nations are so hard to resolve.
Some tend to argue that the issue is largely economic. The whole reason there are disputes over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is over the seabed oil fields nearby, and the whole reason why Japan still argues over islets with Russia and Korea is also over fishing fields and trade routes. According to these arguments, somehow Japan's economy/economic security can be greatly boosted through control over a few islands.
But aside from a few decades of cheap fish and oil, the short term benefits are just as hard to establish as long term strategic interests. An essentially Euro-centric Russia sees no reason for war in sparely populated Far East for further expansion, and Japan should not see itself powerful enough to go at it with nuclear Russia (the Americans sure would not like to see that).
South Korea and Japan are both American allies. The only ones benefiting from their conflict can only be China and North Korea. Similarly, overly aggressive Japanese actions over Diaoyu can also trigger negative popular opinions in American-backed Taiwan (although I see such a tendency to decline over time as young Taiwanese are overwhelmingly pro-Japanese).
With the Americans keeping the other disputes under control, the only unstable factor is China. While Chinese government feels itself to be largely unprepared for any sort of open confrontation against the US, the people seem to see the other way. While the government attempt to stop any popular flairs against Japan, the people's anger have not been extinguished (and only made worse as Japan demands reparations).
And that really is the differing factor between a resolvable and non-resolvable border dispute. Nationalists at home makes a conciliatory gesture by the national government impossible. Looking at Sino-Russian border, the resolution was largely done behind closed doors. As the Chinese populace seemed to care a lot more about the borderline than the Russian general public, sensitive areas fought over during Sino-Soviet split are granted to China.
In exchange, Russia received large tracts of land in places where the Chinese public does not seem to know about the disputes. The method of giving up land to calm nationalism has been so highly successful simply because both the Russians and Chinese knew that public opinion, rather than land itself, is the primary obstacle preventing resolution.
If both sides can see land areas as completely exchangeable items given no nationalist sentiment, the issue can be easily resolved. If, as in the case of Diaoyu Island, or to a larger extent, Taiwan and surrounding islands, the whole disputed area is deeply tied to the so-called national psyche, the only sensible way is to maintain status quo through silence.
Border disputes, after all, cannot be resolved unilaterally. That would give the side losing territory the moral high ground of battling "invaders." Any sudden move by one side to change the status quo should be communicated to the other side beforehand to prevent popular mass anger to overtake logical and calm governments, thereby sending even a tiny issue into the international arena.
Some tend to argue that the issue is largely economic. The whole reason there are disputes over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is over the seabed oil fields nearby, and the whole reason why Japan still argues over islets with Russia and Korea is also over fishing fields and trade routes. According to these arguments, somehow Japan's economy/economic security can be greatly boosted through control over a few islands.
But aside from a few decades of cheap fish and oil, the short term benefits are just as hard to establish as long term strategic interests. An essentially Euro-centric Russia sees no reason for war in sparely populated Far East for further expansion, and Japan should not see itself powerful enough to go at it with nuclear Russia (the Americans sure would not like to see that).
South Korea and Japan are both American allies. The only ones benefiting from their conflict can only be China and North Korea. Similarly, overly aggressive Japanese actions over Diaoyu can also trigger negative popular opinions in American-backed Taiwan (although I see such a tendency to decline over time as young Taiwanese are overwhelmingly pro-Japanese).
With the Americans keeping the other disputes under control, the only unstable factor is China. While Chinese government feels itself to be largely unprepared for any sort of open confrontation against the US, the people seem to see the other way. While the government attempt to stop any popular flairs against Japan, the people's anger have not been extinguished (and only made worse as Japan demands reparations).
And that really is the differing factor between a resolvable and non-resolvable border dispute. Nationalists at home makes a conciliatory gesture by the national government impossible. Looking at Sino-Russian border, the resolution was largely done behind closed doors. As the Chinese populace seemed to care a lot more about the borderline than the Russian general public, sensitive areas fought over during Sino-Soviet split are granted to China.
In exchange, Russia received large tracts of land in places where the Chinese public does not seem to know about the disputes. The method of giving up land to calm nationalism has been so highly successful simply because both the Russians and Chinese knew that public opinion, rather than land itself, is the primary obstacle preventing resolution.
If both sides can see land areas as completely exchangeable items given no nationalist sentiment, the issue can be easily resolved. If, as in the case of Diaoyu Island, or to a larger extent, Taiwan and surrounding islands, the whole disputed area is deeply tied to the so-called national psyche, the only sensible way is to maintain status quo through silence.
Border disputes, after all, cannot be resolved unilaterally. That would give the side losing territory the moral high ground of battling "invaders." Any sudden move by one side to change the status quo should be communicated to the other side beforehand to prevent popular mass anger to overtake logical and calm governments, thereby sending even a tiny issue into the international arena.
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