The Cause and the Effect of the Taiwan Strait Conflict

With the pro-status quo Kuomintang (Nationalists) in power again in Taiwan after eight years under pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, it seems that, at least for now, the growing movement toward
formal independence of Taiwan from the Republic of China (ROC) has been thwarted. But as I have repeatedly observed in Taiwan, the common Taiwanese people, especially among the younger generations with no memories of the ROC's presence on the Chinese mainland, the entire concept of ROC means little if anything.

The young in Taiwan often sees the mainland and mainlanders (even if naturalized US citizens like me) with great deal of suspicion, rejecting any form of deeper friendship with mainlanders even though common logic calls for closer association with people who speaks the same native language. The suspicion, of course, stems from the six decade-long conflict across the Taiwan Strait that divides the two political entities, a conflict that generated an unending array of hostile propaganda and rhetoric on both sides. An increasingly powerful mainland with major global influence and military/economic power can only increase hostility of the Taiwanese out of pure fear for continued survival. 

Anyways, the history and current situations of the Taiwan Strait Conflict needs to be analyzed and examined carefully if the mentality of the people on both sides can be understood and a accurate outlook for the future course of cross-Strait relations be predicted and articulated.  For the common American people and the nations living under the "New World Order", the four years of Bush Administration will probably always remembered by and tied to the ongoing conflict at Iraq. In the eyes of the world, President George W. Bush looks bewildered by the turn of events at the oil-rich Muslim country of the Middle East. 

The Shi'ites, long had been the greatest ally of the U.S. in the war against Saddam Hussein, rose in rebellion against the American soldiers under their youthful leader, cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The Bush
Administration responded by delaying the rotation of troops in Iraq, putting inferiorly-trained Reservists, sending troops stationed at Europe, other parts of Middle East, and even South Korea to Iraq as
reinforcements.

But in one part of the world, the presence of U.S. troops never seem
to have a tendency of decreasing, no matter war or peace in other
parts of the world, and that is the Taiwan Strait, a body of water
that separates the communist Chinese mainland and the democratic
island of Taiwan. The U.S. Pacific Fleet continuously maintains
several aircraft carriers and Aegis cruisers that patrol the area
without stop. To many, this is a surprise. Although the Bush
Administration and the Clinton Administration criticized the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) for official corruption, persecution of the
Falung Gong sect, the ineffective treatment of the SARS epidemic, and
the lack of political reforms, and dispute with the CCP over the trade
deficit and the long-sought Tibetan independence, the CCP has helped
the Americans significantly at solving the North Korean nuclear weapon
crisis, and earned admiration from all over the world for its
continuous economic development in a world characterized by recession
in developed nations of Europe and Japan.

Since the defeat of the Nationalists in 1949 and Chiang Kai-shek's
escape to Taiwan, the sovereignty of the island has been a matter of
continuous debate. Mao Zedong didn't lose time is assuring the
returning Taiwan to the "embrace of its motherland", while Chiang
Kai-shek stressed that he will return to the mainland will American
military support. The Sino-Soviet split and Richard Nixon's first
American official visit to communist China in the early 1970's brought
new hope for the Chinese mainlanders in the decades-long struggle for
unification. This is followed by the U.S. recognition, the entry of
People's Republic of China (PRC) to the UN as a member of the Security
Council with the exit of Taiwan, or the Republic of China (ROC), and
the first appearance of the "one China" policy. But all weren't
negative for the Nationalists in Taiwan; the U.S. retained its right
to intervene on the side of the Nationalists in the case of war
between them and the Communists.

It is not difficult to understand why many consider status quo in this
region a necessity. The war between the mainland and the Taiwanese
government essentially means the beginning of a struggle between two
nuclear powers, the U.S. and the PRC, and the battlefield would be the
island of Taiwan. The war would devastate the economy of both Taiwan
and the PRC and possibly destroy the democracy in Taiwan the U.S. and
the Taiwanese leadership tried so hard to develop, but most
importantly, this war would return the U.S.-China relations to the
pre-1970's level in which the Communist leadership isolated itself
from the Western world and look at everything Western with suspect and
hostility. This is something that the U.S. have been trying to prevent
since the Nixon visit, which tried to integrate China into the world
economy by supporting Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms and to make it
a part of the international community by helping it to obtain an
increasingly significant voice in international affairs and joining
groups such as the WTO and the WHO.

One man, however, didn't seem to understand the importance of the
significance of the continuing status quo. President Chen Shui-bian of
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the first Taiwanese leader not
from the Nationalists, was elected president in early 2000. From the
first day of his presidency, the young president was filled with the
ambition of "Taiwanese Independence". The Taiwanese independence
movement Chen launched wasn't the first of its kind. The former
president of the ROC, the Nationalist Lee Teng-hui, an ethnic
Taiwanese, also called for the "independence of the island of Taiwan
from the Republic of China" to create "the Republic of Taiwan (ROT)",
but due to the influence of conservative Nationalists controlling the
Legislature, it didn't last to cause a major commotion in the
Taiwanese society. But the movement Chen started does.
The renew of the Taiwanese independence movement is made possible by
his signing of the laws allowing referendums, the voting of the common
citizens of the island whose decisions can bypass the eyes of the
Legislature and made into law. Although the referendum does not allow
for the voting on the issues concerning the independence of Taiwan, it
nevertheless pushed the Taiwanese Independence movement onto the next
level. After all, the vast majority of the residents of the island of
Taiwan are ethnic-Taiwanese, as opposed to the ethnic-mainlander
minority that came to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek after 1949, who now
possess a majority in the ROC Legislature. Chen knows that his fellow
ethnic-Taiwanese will support his efforts and although the referendum
on the independence is illegal, but he knows that through the power of
the referendum, it is merely a matter of time before it can be
legalized and the ROT established.

To many foreigners as well as Chinese, this rather disturbing, if not
dangerous, conflict is confusing from the start. Why do they (the
mainlanders and the Taiwanese) fight over control of China? Aren't
they all Chinese? The answer of the ROC government (and many American
politicians) is that the PRC is ruled by an oppressive dictatorship
while a liberal democracy exists on the island of Taiwan. While
Taiwanese enjoy their freedoms, mainlanders are persecuted for
expressing political views and practicing religions not officially
supported by the government. Yes, this is probably the first and the
most important reason for alienation of the PRC by the Taiwanese. Yet,
as mainland China appear into the global theater more and more as
steadily improving in both economically, and less noticed, politically
(a good example of this would be the relative freedom of speech on the
Internet, which is becoming more and more commonplace among China's
emerging urban middle classes) through continuous reforms push forward
encouragingly by the Communist government itself.

What is the reason for the conflict, then? One of the motivations for
the continuation of the conflict for both sides after five long
decades is both sides' ability to gaining support from the common
people. On the mainland, the CCP effectively uses the People's Daily,
the most widely read newspaper in mainland China, as well as the
provincial and municipal newspapers (state-owned, of course), as a
propaganda machine that ceaselessly attack on topics such as Taiwanese
independence movement and the Falung Gong sect. In Taiwan, especially
since the beginning of the Chen Shui-bian presidency, the authorities
have acted to point out to its citizens that mainland China is a
foreign country and the mainlanders are a foreign people. For example,
the new history book for high school published by Taiwanese
authorities put majority of Chinese literature into the category of
"world literature", showing how the Taiwanese leadership have
disregarded not just the Chinese people, but also everything that
represents China itself, such as its culture and heritage.

The long period of conflict also acted as a catalyst to the ongoing
conflict. A new generation of mainlanders and the Taiwanese grew up
amidst the rivalry across the Taiwan Strait, not knowing the true
identity of the people on the other side of the Strait, because of the
long time loss of contact between two sides, became especially
vulnerable to the influence of the government propagandas. And in
Taiwan, these propagandas are combined with the teaching that the
people of Taiwan are "Taiwanese" instead of "Chinese" (this teaching
made many recognize themselves as ethnic-Taiwanese even when their
origins are in mainland China), made the radical Taiwanese
independence movement to sound logical and created more support for
Chen's referendum laws.

Of course, such activity won't go unnoticed the PRC. Beijing announced
its opposition to the referendum laws immediately after their proposal
by the DPP in Taiwan. And the Chinese didn't limit themselves to
verbal criticism. The Chinese military, or the People's Liberation
Army (PLA), launched a series of demonstrations intended to arise
attention, most feasibly, fear, in the DPP government as well as the
broad Taiwanese public. These demonstrations include the amphibious
landing operations, joint rescue operations with the French navy, and
even the "testing" of a short-range ballistic missile in which the
missile was fired into the sea not far from the island of Taiwan. The
PLA also continuous worried the Taiwanese government as well as the
U.S. by sending aircrafts and submarines into the vicinity of the ROC
territory.

Outright showing of its military prowess is not the only way the
Chinese government deals with the continuous threat of the Taiwan
Independence. One of the most effective ways the PRC government makes
Taiwan Independence movement less heard and supported is to isolate
The Republic of China from international community. A good example
would be the continuous blocking of the ROC's reentrance to the UN.
Beginning 1993, the ROC government has been bidding for a UN seat
annually, but its efforts have not produced a result. Also over the
last few decades, nation that have official diplomatic relationships
have declined from hundreds down to only a countable few. And most of
these "friendly" nations of Taiwan are impoverished nations of Africa
and Oceania that the ROC government keeps "friendly" only by
continuous flow of economic aid.

Of course, any actions of the Taiwan Strait will cause a reaction in
the U.S. Overall, the U.S. policy of the Taiwan Strait conflict is
based on the preservation of the current status quo, whether the
policy is from the current Bush Administration or the past Republican
and Democrat governments. After all, the U.S. government had learned
to believe that Taiwan is used as a restraint to continuous expansion
of Chinese power and prevention to Chinese dominance of the East Asia
region, because of its unique location (the island is a short distance
to mainland China's economic centers, Shanghai and Hong Kong) The
island is something it does not want to give up by any means.

At the core of this policy lies the American government's ambiguity of
the translation of the "one China" policy ("There's only one China,
and Taiwan is part of China"). One major fault of the policy is the
fact that it did not state what "China" represent, and this fault is
interpreted differently by officials in mainland China, Taiwan, and
the U.S. to use the policy to their own advantage. According to the
officials of the CCP made it clear that "China" is the PRC and Taiwan
is a "breakaway province" while conservative Nationalists of Taiwan
states that "China" is the ROC and it have legitimate sovereignty over
the mainland (a good example of this belief is that the ROC government
have a position of the "provincial governor of Taiwan").

The U.S. government doesn't hold a clear definition of the term
"China" in the "one China" policy. The interpretation changes
depending on the situation when it is cited, but sometimes the U.S.
officials says that "China" is the united country of mainland China
and Taiwan, an evidence of the government's attempt at neutrality at
the issue. Of course, this is not the only aspect of the Taiwan Strait
conflict that the U.S. has shown desire of status quo. In the
increasing arms race of the ROC and the PRC, the U.S. has clarified
that any arm sale it make to Taiwan is to balance the power between
the PLA and Army of Republic of China (ROCA), although weapons the ROC
bought from U.S. such as Kidd class destroyers and Patriot missiles
are highly competitive weapons and the Chinese naval forces can never
match the power of the U.S. Pacific fleet.

Of course, there is a chance that a united nation of China and Taiwan
the U.S. wishes for will be established in the future. The only
foreseeable possibility for this to become a reality is to apply to
Taiwan the "one country, two systems" policy the PRC uses for
governing Hong Kong and Macao, because it can be achieved without
neither mainland nor Taiwan having to change its political system.
This policy allow for Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative
Region to continue to elect its own leaders and retain a system of
democracy after their return to mainland China. Despite the fact that
this policy allow for democracy to continue and allow Taiwanese to
maintain self control over the economy, the negative sides to the
policy is also evident, causing suspicion among people of Taiwan.

First of all, the "one country, two systems" means that Taiwan must
give up all of its military forces and allow the PLA to place its
armed forces in Taiwan. Even as the Taiwanese preserve their
democracy, these troops will influence how the new Taiwanese
leadership treats their counterpart in Beijing, and if Beijing wishes
to, it can use these troops to intervene in Taiwanese politics.
Second, Taiwan will be totally vulnerable to Beijing's change in
political and economic policies. Despite continuation of its autonomy,
Taiwan will have no voice in the process of decision-making in
Beijing, so Beijing's decisions, especially those regarding foreign
policies will apply to mainland China and Taiwan without consulting
with Taiwanese leadership.

Finally and most controversially, the "one country, two systems" imply
that Taiwan belong with China to "one country" called People's
Republic of China, and the five-decade long Republic of China (or the
hope for the Republic of Taiwan, in the case of Chen Shui-bian's
Taiwan independence movement) will cease to exist. To many
conservative Nationalists as well as supporter of Chen's DPP, it would
be utterly unacceptable to surrender the nation they live to
acknowledge to be a symbol of freedom from a powerful communist
dictatorship. Then who is the driving force behind the immediate
unification of China in Taiwan? Certainly, the PRC will continue to
push for it, albeit the fact that it has few supporters in Taiwan.

However, one of the most significant constituent in the force of
unification is surprisingly, a group of people that have few political
experiences; they are the Taiwanese merchants who have asserted
themselves in the lucrative Chinese market. To understand their rash
for unification of Taiwan and China, we must have knowledge of the
Taiwan economy and their role in it. Taiwan is one of the "Four
Tigers" of Asia along with South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong, four
nations that quickly industrialized after World War II based on the
successful Japanese model. The growth of the mainland Chinese
industrialization, producing inexpensive merchandises, diminished the
export-based Taiwanese economy by taking over Taiwan's export market
at Europe and America.

Nevertheless, the Taiwanese businessmen found a way to prop up their
ailing economy, and it is for them to export to mainland whatever the
"the factory of the world" needs to be kept in motion, such as steel,
machines, and above all, manufacturing technologies. Also, many of
Taiwan's giant firms relocated their factories to mainland, thus
lowering their prices and regained a large share of market that it
lost to the less well-known Chinese companies. In fact, the Taiwanese
businessmen are so triumphant that Taiwan has a trade surplus over
China, and this trade surplus has become the main source of income for
Taiwan. For the Taiwanese businessmen, the unification of China and
Taiwan means that the no longer have to transport goods indirectly
between China and Taiwan (usually through Hong Kong), and that will
help them, and the consumers on both sides of the Strait, save
unnecessary money spent moving the merchandises.

From the current situation, the Taiwanese merchants' dreams are not
likely to come true. Against the tides of Chen Shui-bian's radical
rhetoric, Beijing has stated that it "will not give up the military
option to united Taiwan" while stressing the importance of peaceful
reunification (by which they mean the "one country, two systems"
policy), to which Chen have not back down a bit despite warnings and
advices by the U.S. government to persist the peace and the status
quo. What if the war really starts? Economically, the Taiwanese
merchants will be expelled from mainland China and Taiwan will lose
its main source of income. But this should be least of Taiwan's
problem since it is highly likely that the U.S. will provide some type
of economic aid to the island even if it does not enter the war
militarily.

If the U.S. does not enter the war, the ensuing struggle will be a
nightmare for the Taiwanese. In the beginning, the PRC will utilize
its 500+ (and always increasing) short-range ballistic missiles aimed
at Taiwan to take out the ROC's political, economic, communication,
and military centers (Taiwan's Patriot Missiles are too few to stop
the majority of the incoming Chinese missiles; besides, the PLA can
replenish its stock of ballistic missiles much faster than the ROC can
buy in more Patriot Missiles from the U.S.) without retaliation
(Taiwan devised a plan to attack China's Three Gorges Dam, but no
weapon Taiwan possess can breach the heavy defense around the Dam).

Then, PLA will order the South Sea Fleet to engage the ROC Navy while
its Air Force engages in dogfights against ROC fighters, both of which
should end in PLA victory because of the destruction of the naval and
air bases caused by Chinese missiles. With the disappearing of
Taiwanese aircrafts and warships, the PLA will successfully launch an
amphibious landing and destroy what remains of the Taiwanese defense.
The entire scenario will change if the U.S. declares war on China. In
days, the Pentagon can start engaging Chinese forces with warships
patrolling the Western Pacific (including aircraft carriers and Aegis
cruisers with advanced ability in intercepting Chinese missiles, from
Japan and Pearl Harbor), aircrafts (naval aircrafts off carriers and
strategic bombers off Guam), and Army and Marines troops (from South
Korea and Okinawa) In few weeks, U.S. can place its additional naval
forces within strike range of China (aircraft carriers battle groups
from the Persian Gulf and San Diego). Both the Americans and the
Chinese know that this would make the defeat of the Chinese
inevitable. Thus, the Chinese and the Americans will fight over the
element of time: while the Chinese will try to destroy the ROC
military as quickly as possible, the U.S. will be moving its warships
to the Taiwan Strait with maximum speed.

If the Chinese destroy the ROC armed forces and American forces within
the immediate range of the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan surrenders before
the arrival of further American assistance, there's a slight chance
that the U.S. will back off its military presence in South China Sea
and the war would end. However, this situation is not likely to happen
due to the overall strength of the U.S. forces of the region (which is
increasing with the addition of more bombers to Guam and more ships to
patrol the South China Sea) compared to the small and less
technologically advanced Chinese South Sea and East Sea Fleets and Air
Force and the U.S. government's unwillingness to abandon its current
foreign policy. The Administration will not allow China to expend
beyond its interest.

If the U.S. will continue to battle the Chinese after Taiwan's fall,
or if the American reinforcement reach the Strait before Taiwan's
fall, the war will take a different, and a dangerous, route. For the
CCP leadership in Beijing, it will be increasing difficult to reach
their original goal, and at the same time, it will face the threat of
U.S. bombing on its homeland. In such a circumstance, Beijing either
has to withdraw its invasion forces around Taiwan and call a
cease-fire, or in desperation, uses nuclear weaponry against the U.S.
armed forces or maybe even U.S. territory. For the PRC leadership, the
first option is not feasible: not only will it lose face, it will
worsen the diplomatic relationship with the U.S., its largest export
market, and it will give the U.S. a perfect excuse to send in more
military force in Western Pacific and some into Taiwan, and monitor
its military as well as daily economic and political actions more
closely and cautiously.

The second option, although doubtful even for the most radical
politician in Beijing, is still an option that U.S. should not forget
that the Chinese have. For one thing, launching nuclear missiles would
give the Chinese leadership something anti-American Middle Easterners
wished that Saddam could have had. That is what many will call bravery
and others will call boldness, the willingness to stand and fight the
superior American forces with everything one have. For certain, such
willingness will only result in one thing the humankind has wished to
never happen, the exchange of nuclear weapons. One Chinese radical
argued that China will win a nuclear exchange for that the U.S. will
run out of people before the China does, leaving the U.S. in waste
while the Chinese people rebuild their civilization.

Whether the outcome of the war is the Chinese unification with
Taiwanese destruction, Chinese humiliation with American domination,
or American, Chinese, and Taiwanese obliteration with nuclear
utilization, if a war starts in the Taiwan Strait, the future of the
Western Pacific region looks grim. What can the three sides involved
in the Taiwan Strait Conflict do to resolve the crisis without
violence? The entire situation will depend if and how Chen Shui-bian
can use the referendum laws to his advantage and push for the Taiwan
independence. If he succeeds, the Taiwan Strait will be one step
closer to war, especially since Beijing has decisively mentioned that
it will use military means to stop the Taiwan independence even if it
has to give up the chance to hold the 2008 Olympics in Beijing and the
2010 World Expo in Shanghai.

U.S. government, as the mediator of the conflict, will have to
accomplish the following to keep the fragile and delicate status quo.
First, arrange and head meetings between Beijing and Taiwan in order
to make the direct transportation across the Taiwan Strait possible,
making the anti-independence Taiwanese businessmen more powerful and
the Taiwanese economy more healthy, thus making the ordinary Taiwanese
people see the benefits of friendly confederation between mainland and
the island with more optimism and Chen's Taiwan independence with less
interest. Second, keep the military presence strong around the Taiwan
Strait. Continue the frequent naval patrols in the South China Sea and
the Western Pacific, and perform military demonstrations (not with
Taiwan, however. Because such an act will only Chen Shui-bian more
confident that the U.S. will support him during a possible war and his
cause for Taiwan independence) to make PRC leadership more hesitant
about use of military means solving the conflict.

Third, continue to denounce the Taiwan independence and stress the
importance of the status quo. It is in the American interest to see
the maintenance of the Republic of China on Taiwan. As I stated
before, Taiwan is used as a restraint to continuous expansion of
Chinese power and prevention to Chinese dominance of the East Asia
region. Yet, it is also valuable to the U.S. that a new nation does
not emerge out of the ROC. Not only will it provoke a war the U.S.
cannot afford, whatever the outcome of the war, it will destroy the
balance of power in East Asia. The lack of balance of power will cause
creation of politically and economically unstable dictatorships and
harbor anti-American activities. And at last, improve diplomatic
relations with China. Appreciate Chinese assistance with the North
Korean nuclear missile crisis, admire rapid economic development and
political reform, even if it is subtle, and restrain the criticism on
sensitive issues such as human rights, SARS, Falung Gong, and Tibet.
Right now, the preservation of peace and friendliness to the U.S.
should come before everything else. If the US government can achieve
these, we will have peace in the Taiwan Strait for our times.