Is Center-Periphery Conflict an Unavoidable Fact in Large Countries?

The campus of the Far Eastern Federal University is a gorgeous one.  Situated on the mostly wild Russky Island south of Vladivostok, it is a mishmash of imposing modern buildings connected to the century-old downtown area with spectacular suspension bridges.  Perhaps as a result of its extraordinary setting, it serves as the regular venue of the East Asia Summit that bring together political leaders from Russia and its East Asian neighbors.  But for the importance of the Summit for Russia's Look East economic policy, locals are a bit annoyed by the Summit serving to shut down the city for weeks at a time.

 

The University campus being repeatedly borrowed for top-level politicians is only one of many negative things locals in the city say about Moscow's political control.  Ever since laws are changed to make regional governors appointees of the federal government rather than locally elected, policymaking in this region, thousands of miles from the capital, have become more aligned with interests of the Kremlin, at the expense of the local general publics interests.  In the economic realm, where Vladivostok's context is so different that of Moscow, Moscow's direct control has been a particular source of local dissatisfaction.

On paper, the federal and local mentality toward economic development in the Russian Far East should not be all that different.  Both want more investment and people streaming in, and both realize the best bet to get money from the Asians and people from the rest of Russia.  But below the similarity in overall strategy lies significant differences in desirable execution.  Moscow, keen to preserve its own interest, want Moscow-based conglomerates to spearhead the effort, with focuses on energy and commerce backed up with official blessings at the highest political levels. 

Locals in the Far East, in contrast, want a much more devolved system, where local businessmen, along with their grassroots-level business partners across the borders playing the central role.  They see healthiest international relations being one of minimal political involvement from the above, but purely based on satisfying the needs of the local population, using locally available resources and connections.  Unfortunately, the local desire for more "bottom-up" international relations are torpedoed by Moscow's decisions to unilaterally raise import tariffs without local consultation.

Such unilateral actions by Moscow put paid to the strategic role that Vladivostok and the wider region can play to tie Russia more closely with East Asia.  Once vibrant trade in used cars are killed off by the tariffs.  Local business men's dealings in coal exports have been usurped by Moscow-based oligarchs, and ability for local players, both political and economic, have been minimized as Asians increasingly bypass the Far East to talk to power brokers in Moscow.  Asians know that in today's Russia, Moscow makes all the major decisions with little influence from the region's. 

Unsurprisingly, it is the elites of Moscow who benefit from the centralized approach in dealing with Asia, rather than people of the Far East.  The resentment of the locals here, then, lead to what many scholars have termed the center-periphery conflict in Russia.  The center at Moscow enforce laws and policies in ways that increase its own benefit, in the process sucking away resources and potential channels for development in different localities like Vladivostok.  Given the local governor is appointed by Moscow, there is little political will locally to fight back against the center's dominance. 

Yet, such conflicts between the federal and local governments are not unique to Russia.  In all large countries with different geographies that have different interests, there are sources of similar conflicts.  California fights against Trump, Okinawa is angered by Tokyo, and many of China's borderlands are dismissive of Beijing.  Each of these localities are far enough from the capital city and the top national leaders to quietly rebel against some policies.  And each has enough unique local economic and political interests, rooted in popular support, to be able to sustain the quiet rebellion. 

At the same time, it is important not to overemphasize the locals' discontent.  The people of Vladivostok are not seeking independence from Moscow.  The economic and political costs are just too high and the benefits too little, not to mention the emotional and cultural ties.  The same goes for examples in other countries.  But if the center cannot compromise to certain degree, recognizing the needs and demands of the local population for some autonomy in policymaking, then small quiet rebellions can quickly become large and sustained.