One Country, Two Worlds
One of the first thing a visitor to major towns in Peninsular Malaysia's East Coast would be the flags hoisted on steel poles. The Malaysian national flag, the state flag, and...umm? Is that a little Palestinian flag flying below the state flag? Support for Palestinian freedom seems like part of daily lives here. Shops and hotels seem to always have donation boxes for the Palestinian cause, and banners point out how Malaysia ought to be the second home for Palestinian refugees. Indeed, Malaysia has pledged medical and financial support for Gaza during times of Israeli invasions, but the rhetoric in KL has never reached this magnitude.
But the outright support for Palestine is just one of many visible differences that set this part of Malaysia, always more conservative and Islamic, apart from the bright lights of international-minded KL. Massive mosques dominate townscapes, their presence both physically felt in their sheer size, visible banners promoting Islam as the "only true religion," and emotionally felt with loud calls of prayers and steady stream of traffic in and out of their front gates. Whereas commerce and diversity became the mainstays of everyday life in KL, in the East Coast, religion is clinging on, creating a unique culture and socio-political environment.
And lastly (most importantly, in some way), English is no longer widespread. Anglophone KL gives way to towns where locals do not speak a single word of English. Jawi (Arabic script of Malay language) replaces English on street and shop signs, complemented (and perhaps, promoted) by looming presence of office buildings of the many Islamic NGOs and political parties headquartered in the area. Thanks to the lack of basic English conversational skills, the author managed to even get off at the wrong bus stop on the way back to KL, something he previously thought impossible given English's primacy in this country.
Interestingly enough, just as the author was being mesmerized by the other cultural extreme of Malaysia, a latest round of political demonstrations in Hong Kong was pitting protesters against a police force forcefully removing them from the city's main squares. As if a deja vu from the Taiwanese protests from few months back, the government seemed not at all be on the same page as angry students and general populace. But the difference is that, this time around, the opposing sides in the ring are rulers in Beijing and the people in Hong Kong...politically from one country, as much as many people will say otherwise.
That very fact draws parallels to what is happening in this conservative pocket of Islamic Malaysia. Different language, political beliefs, and religion, under the auspices of different historical belongings and administrative jurisdiction, gave way to straight-up confrontations demanding political independence. This prospect facing Hong Kong today can be easily replicated across the world, even in places where the usual stories of ethnic tensions supposedly do not exist. Indeed, just around the neighborhood, Aceh's often militant battle for self-governance from Indonesia should hit pretty close to home for the East Coast Malays.
To such direct confrontation of the violent kind, the central government really only has two realistic choices. The first, as done in Indonesia for both Aceh and later, East Timor, is devolution of power. heads of state can cross fingers that giving up some powers can satisfy the "rebels" and prevent them from seeking more power and, ultimately, complete break from the center. Or, in complete absence of such faith, as is the case in Beijing, the state swiftly move into suppression, putting a lid on the flames of revolt but makes no real effort to seek out the fuel that initiated the flames in the first place. Neither is ideal for the ruler at the center.
If anything, the fact the confrontation has happened demonstrate that the central government has already failed in reconciling the essence of "two worlds in one country." For that, proper kudos should be given to Malaysia. By leaving the periphery alone with channels for open expression of different ideologies and execution of those ideologies at regional levels, KL is actually successfully demonstrating the lack of need for greater autonomy in the East Coast. It can be speculated that Malaysia's longtime experience with keeping all three races content with parallel institutions are also working wonders on Malays of different creeds.
Seeing this, the author wonders if the Chinese government's handling of the Hong Kong situation is a bit too active for its own good. By heavy-handedness, Beijing has given endless justification to protesters that greater independence is needed simply for their own "world" to not be swallowed by a much bigger one. Had Beijing simply kept quiet and let the protests continue without doing anything at all, the whole thing might have died down already. After all, as a city of commerce, Hong Kong cannot afford constant disturbances. Just as the Islamism of the East Coast makes no dent on KL's relative liberalism, there ought to be some confidence in Beijing that the Hong Kong experience is not a pan-Chinese one.
But the outright support for Palestine is just one of many visible differences that set this part of Malaysia, always more conservative and Islamic, apart from the bright lights of international-minded KL. Massive mosques dominate townscapes, their presence both physically felt in their sheer size, visible banners promoting Islam as the "only true religion," and emotionally felt with loud calls of prayers and steady stream of traffic in and out of their front gates. Whereas commerce and diversity became the mainstays of everyday life in KL, in the East Coast, religion is clinging on, creating a unique culture and socio-political environment.
And lastly (most importantly, in some way), English is no longer widespread. Anglophone KL gives way to towns where locals do not speak a single word of English. Jawi (Arabic script of Malay language) replaces English on street and shop signs, complemented (and perhaps, promoted) by looming presence of office buildings of the many Islamic NGOs and political parties headquartered in the area. Thanks to the lack of basic English conversational skills, the author managed to even get off at the wrong bus stop on the way back to KL, something he previously thought impossible given English's primacy in this country.
Interestingly enough, just as the author was being mesmerized by the other cultural extreme of Malaysia, a latest round of political demonstrations in Hong Kong was pitting protesters against a police force forcefully removing them from the city's main squares. As if a deja vu from the Taiwanese protests from few months back, the government seemed not at all be on the same page as angry students and general populace. But the difference is that, this time around, the opposing sides in the ring are rulers in Beijing and the people in Hong Kong...politically from one country, as much as many people will say otherwise.
That very fact draws parallels to what is happening in this conservative pocket of Islamic Malaysia. Different language, political beliefs, and religion, under the auspices of different historical belongings and administrative jurisdiction, gave way to straight-up confrontations demanding political independence. This prospect facing Hong Kong today can be easily replicated across the world, even in places where the usual stories of ethnic tensions supposedly do not exist. Indeed, just around the neighborhood, Aceh's often militant battle for self-governance from Indonesia should hit pretty close to home for the East Coast Malays.
To such direct confrontation of the violent kind, the central government really only has two realistic choices. The first, as done in Indonesia for both Aceh and later, East Timor, is devolution of power. heads of state can cross fingers that giving up some powers can satisfy the "rebels" and prevent them from seeking more power and, ultimately, complete break from the center. Or, in complete absence of such faith, as is the case in Beijing, the state swiftly move into suppression, putting a lid on the flames of revolt but makes no real effort to seek out the fuel that initiated the flames in the first place. Neither is ideal for the ruler at the center.
If anything, the fact the confrontation has happened demonstrate that the central government has already failed in reconciling the essence of "two worlds in one country." For that, proper kudos should be given to Malaysia. By leaving the periphery alone with channels for open expression of different ideologies and execution of those ideologies at regional levels, KL is actually successfully demonstrating the lack of need for greater autonomy in the East Coast. It can be speculated that Malaysia's longtime experience with keeping all three races content with parallel institutions are also working wonders on Malays of different creeds.
Seeing this, the author wonders if the Chinese government's handling of the Hong Kong situation is a bit too active for its own good. By heavy-handedness, Beijing has given endless justification to protesters that greater independence is needed simply for their own "world" to not be swallowed by a much bigger one. Had Beijing simply kept quiet and let the protests continue without doing anything at all, the whole thing might have died down already. After all, as a city of commerce, Hong Kong cannot afford constant disturbances. Just as the Islamism of the East Coast makes no dent on KL's relative liberalism, there ought to be some confidence in Beijing that the Hong Kong experience is not a pan-Chinese one.
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