For those people who are following Taiwanese politics at the moment, the past few days have been a bonanza. An ambiguous announcement by the ruling Ma Ying-jeou administration that the ongoing ratification process for a second-stage free trade agreement with China will somehow bypass the normal legislative process has triggered a severe backlash from Taipei's student community. In response to the legislature's meek non-response to executive intentions from the presidency, the students have surrounded, stormed, and occupied the legislature, starting a sit-in protest that is now entering its sixth day with no stop in sight.
The students' motivation is clearly stated. It is their belief that the Ma administration's decision to bypass the normal legislative process to speed through the agreement's ratification, in essence, betrays certain shortcomings within the agreement that hope to hide from the opposition parties' and the general public's views. The opposition, as well as some in Ma's own pan-Blue party alliance, has not wasted words in criticizing such behaviors as a "black-box operation," an unconstitutional suppression of democratic principles in order to expedite his own political goals.
As for what those political goals are, the verdict, at least from the third-party observer's point of view, remains highly unclear and ambiguous. For one thing, Ma's subsequent statements in response to the ongoing protests only mentions the economic aspect of the agreement. The necessity of Taiwan to open up its economy to China is a springboard for it to further loosen economic restrictions vis-a-vis other major economies, thereby increasing its export competitiveness on the Chinese and world markets with respect to traditional competitors like South Korea.
Repeatedly focusing on the pure economics of the agreement, however, shows that Ma is still on a different page from the protesters. Certainly, there are anxieties of a pure economic nature among the Taiwanese, who fear a "Hong-Kong-ization" of their society with massive influxes of Chinese investments and even labor. Prices for limited resources are bound to increase faster than wages, and government effort to bring up salaries may lead to higher unemployment among the youths. By in the grand scheme of things, these pure economic concerns remain trivial in comparison to the political implications.
Instead, passing the agreement in the way Ma originally intended for it to have sets a dangerous constitutional precedent in Taiwan's still fragile democratic structure. For a matter as integral to the common people's livelihoods as a free trade agreement, if taken out of the people's supervision, can only become a process that breeds highly corruptible invasion of business interests in political decision-making. Slowly dismantling checks and balances, fewer and fewer politicians at the top monopolize decision-making power, using increasing opaqueness of their limits of power to enrich themselves in "private business transactions."
Of course, this is not to say that those opposed to such possibilities of politico-business entanglements are pure idealists. Opportunism abound, especially among the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who seek to use this opportunity to completely discredit democratic credentials of all pan-Blue parties ahead of the next presidential elections. Anti-Ma factions in pan-Blue, especially those from the People's First Party, are also using this as a chance to restructure party allegiances within the pan-Blue coalition. Whether they would do the same if in Ma's shoes is highly dubious question that no one has yet to ask.
Finally, lets go back to the pure economic perspective for a second and assess what Taiwan will look like with the agreement. One thing for sure is that it will not be an economic panacea that Ma administration claims it to be. Taiwan's declining export competitiveness is no longer just an issue of pricing, as this agreement seek to address, but also a matter of quality. Lack of government support prevented Taiwanese products from moving up the value-chain in the same way South Korean products have, making markets for Taiwanese products smaller and smaller. Years of government policies are to be blamed for this situation.
Conversely, though, the detrimental effects of the so-called "Chinese economic invasion" will not nearly be as serious as some Taiwanese proclaims. Taiwan, after all, is not Hong Kong. Taiwan does not serve as a financial center and gateway to global commerce Chinese firm take advantage of for Hong Kong. Given the small, competitive market of sluggish growth that Taiwan is, most Chinese firms sees little reason to invest and expect high returns. This is all the more true given the stagnant wage levels and low opinions of both Chinese people and products prevalent in Taiwanese society. Economically, the agreement is no game-changer.
The students' motivation is clearly stated. It is their belief that the Ma administration's decision to bypass the normal legislative process to speed through the agreement's ratification, in essence, betrays certain shortcomings within the agreement that hope to hide from the opposition parties' and the general public's views. The opposition, as well as some in Ma's own pan-Blue party alliance, has not wasted words in criticizing such behaviors as a "black-box operation," an unconstitutional suppression of democratic principles in order to expedite his own political goals.
As for what those political goals are, the verdict, at least from the third-party observer's point of view, remains highly unclear and ambiguous. For one thing, Ma's subsequent statements in response to the ongoing protests only mentions the economic aspect of the agreement. The necessity of Taiwan to open up its economy to China is a springboard for it to further loosen economic restrictions vis-a-vis other major economies, thereby increasing its export competitiveness on the Chinese and world markets with respect to traditional competitors like South Korea.
Repeatedly focusing on the pure economics of the agreement, however, shows that Ma is still on a different page from the protesters. Certainly, there are anxieties of a pure economic nature among the Taiwanese, who fear a "Hong-Kong-ization" of their society with massive influxes of Chinese investments and even labor. Prices for limited resources are bound to increase faster than wages, and government effort to bring up salaries may lead to higher unemployment among the youths. By in the grand scheme of things, these pure economic concerns remain trivial in comparison to the political implications.
Instead, passing the agreement in the way Ma originally intended for it to have sets a dangerous constitutional precedent in Taiwan's still fragile democratic structure. For a matter as integral to the common people's livelihoods as a free trade agreement, if taken out of the people's supervision, can only become a process that breeds highly corruptible invasion of business interests in political decision-making. Slowly dismantling checks and balances, fewer and fewer politicians at the top monopolize decision-making power, using increasing opaqueness of their limits of power to enrich themselves in "private business transactions."
Of course, this is not to say that those opposed to such possibilities of politico-business entanglements are pure idealists. Opportunism abound, especially among the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who seek to use this opportunity to completely discredit democratic credentials of all pan-Blue parties ahead of the next presidential elections. Anti-Ma factions in pan-Blue, especially those from the People's First Party, are also using this as a chance to restructure party allegiances within the pan-Blue coalition. Whether they would do the same if in Ma's shoes is highly dubious question that no one has yet to ask.
Finally, lets go back to the pure economic perspective for a second and assess what Taiwan will look like with the agreement. One thing for sure is that it will not be an economic panacea that Ma administration claims it to be. Taiwan's declining export competitiveness is no longer just an issue of pricing, as this agreement seek to address, but also a matter of quality. Lack of government support prevented Taiwanese products from moving up the value-chain in the same way South Korean products have, making markets for Taiwanese products smaller and smaller. Years of government policies are to be blamed for this situation.
Conversely, though, the detrimental effects of the so-called "Chinese economic invasion" will not nearly be as serious as some Taiwanese proclaims. Taiwan, after all, is not Hong Kong. Taiwan does not serve as a financial center and gateway to global commerce Chinese firm take advantage of for Hong Kong. Given the small, competitive market of sluggish growth that Taiwan is, most Chinese firms sees little reason to invest and expect high returns. This is all the more true given the stagnant wage levels and low opinions of both Chinese people and products prevalent in Taiwanese society. Economically, the agreement is no game-changer.
Comments
Post a Comment