It has been more than a month since one of the largest typhoon swept across Philippines, destroying major towns along the way, and killing tens of thousands, with several times more still unaccounted for in remote, still unreachable villages. Previously, discussions on the lack of political will to build adequate infrastructure, legitimatized by the democratically elected political dynasties building up local cults of personality among uneducated voters, only served to exacerbate the suffering. But the intersection of systemic corruption and politics, interestingly enough, is now an Asia-wide issue.
Let's put aside the widespread corruption within Philippine bureaucracy that makes the government unprepared resource-wise after every major disaster, and simply look at how the supposed corruption is used out of context to further political gains for one group at the expense of a rival. In the aftermath of the typhoon, the Romualdez ruling family in devastated Tacloban wasted no effort, with tearful melodrama in publicized conferences, to denounce the central government led by rival Aquino clan of corruption that deprived needed resources for his city to rebuild.
Emotionally moving as it all sounds, the issue of corruption has clearly been used by Romualdez to discredit Aquino, assisting his ally (and cousin) Marcos for using the opportunity to gain popular support in time for the 2016 presidential elections. Without a doubt, the inability of the Aquino administration to rein in widespread corruption associated with distribution of aid to the typhoon-affected areas, with bureaucracies and politicians at every level siphoning off their own share, will be a key issue during that election campaign.
But thankfully, the Philippines, being a democracy with patronage politics of a tiny elite, no major bloodbaths have so far emerged in this process. But recent situations in China, North Korea, and Thailand have been less nuanced and much more swift in changing the balance of power, all with corruption as one of the main "crimes" committed by the embattled side. The supposed corruption has allowed swift changes in the political environment backed by popular support, resulting in quick use of limited violence without significant backlash domestically.
The removal of "state No.2" Jang Song Taek in North Korea and state security chief Zhou Yongkang in China are classic examples of how decisively this procedure can happen in authoritarian states. Public exposure of their "financial indecencies" become an overtone during the procedure, despite the fact that corruption, being so widespread in both states at the official level, was the least damaging reasons for their removals. Yet, the term "corruption" serves as a handy popular appeal to support elite decision for their persecution as losers of internal political struggles, details about which the public will never know.
Similarly but more slowly, financial murkiness has also become somewhat of popular appealing point in the continuing battles to oust the Shinawatra clan from the central seat of political power. The wealthy urban middle class, whose livelihood should be more damageable by financial misalignment in officialdom, justifiably forms the backbone of anti-government protests in Bangkok, much to the opposition of a rural population that most likely benefited from the government's subsidies and handouts, paid by what the middle class perceive as devious allocation of government resources.
Previous discussion on how the middle class serves as the "kingmaker" in survival of the current regime is extremely relevant to just how important appealing to hatred for government corruption in both democracies and autocracies. By showing the middle class that the upcoming political change is beneficial for them by removing the "corrupt" who damages their collective financial position, the side that wishes to enact change can do whatever it pleases to the rival without harming its own political position from the middle class.
Of course, one must remember that who is really corrupt and who is not is entirely irrelevant to the political struggle. The truth is both sides are corrupt and no one in the struggle is losing because they are less corrupt. It is just simply too convenient and too safe for politicians to appeal to hatred for corruption, especially since corruption is so omnipresent and so persistent despite so many perceived attempts to purge them. Intelligent political watchers ought to look at the reasons below the surface while keeping in mind systemic reasons for corruption to persevere.
Let's put aside the widespread corruption within Philippine bureaucracy that makes the government unprepared resource-wise after every major disaster, and simply look at how the supposed corruption is used out of context to further political gains for one group at the expense of a rival. In the aftermath of the typhoon, the Romualdez ruling family in devastated Tacloban wasted no effort, with tearful melodrama in publicized conferences, to denounce the central government led by rival Aquino clan of corruption that deprived needed resources for his city to rebuild.
Emotionally moving as it all sounds, the issue of corruption has clearly been used by Romualdez to discredit Aquino, assisting his ally (and cousin) Marcos for using the opportunity to gain popular support in time for the 2016 presidential elections. Without a doubt, the inability of the Aquino administration to rein in widespread corruption associated with distribution of aid to the typhoon-affected areas, with bureaucracies and politicians at every level siphoning off their own share, will be a key issue during that election campaign.
But thankfully, the Philippines, being a democracy with patronage politics of a tiny elite, no major bloodbaths have so far emerged in this process. But recent situations in China, North Korea, and Thailand have been less nuanced and much more swift in changing the balance of power, all with corruption as one of the main "crimes" committed by the embattled side. The supposed corruption has allowed swift changes in the political environment backed by popular support, resulting in quick use of limited violence without significant backlash domestically.
The removal of "state No.2" Jang Song Taek in North Korea and state security chief Zhou Yongkang in China are classic examples of how decisively this procedure can happen in authoritarian states. Public exposure of their "financial indecencies" become an overtone during the procedure, despite the fact that corruption, being so widespread in both states at the official level, was the least damaging reasons for their removals. Yet, the term "corruption" serves as a handy popular appeal to support elite decision for their persecution as losers of internal political struggles, details about which the public will never know.
Similarly but more slowly, financial murkiness has also become somewhat of popular appealing point in the continuing battles to oust the Shinawatra clan from the central seat of political power. The wealthy urban middle class, whose livelihood should be more damageable by financial misalignment in officialdom, justifiably forms the backbone of anti-government protests in Bangkok, much to the opposition of a rural population that most likely benefited from the government's subsidies and handouts, paid by what the middle class perceive as devious allocation of government resources.
Previous discussion on how the middle class serves as the "kingmaker" in survival of the current regime is extremely relevant to just how important appealing to hatred for government corruption in both democracies and autocracies. By showing the middle class that the upcoming political change is beneficial for them by removing the "corrupt" who damages their collective financial position, the side that wishes to enact change can do whatever it pleases to the rival without harming its own political position from the middle class.
Of course, one must remember that who is really corrupt and who is not is entirely irrelevant to the political struggle. The truth is both sides are corrupt and no one in the struggle is losing because they are less corrupt. It is just simply too convenient and too safe for politicians to appeal to hatred for corruption, especially since corruption is so omnipresent and so persistent despite so many perceived attempts to purge them. Intelligent political watchers ought to look at the reasons below the surface while keeping in mind systemic reasons for corruption to persevere.
Comments
Post a Comment