The End of a War in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Return of "Spheres of Influences"

For most casual readers of world history, the term "sphere of influence" has a distinct feel of yesteryears. The word conjures the image of colonial heydays when European powers drew artificial lines on a world map to mark the geographical limits of their competing interests. Within the drawn boundaries, puppet states were without any ability to make any independent decisions. Instead, small states are forced to follow the grand designs of their superpower "allies" and "partners" and not communicate with other superpowers. Students of history are taught that with the advent of formally signed agreements, of political, economic, and military nature, such "spheres of influences," grounded in unequal relationships between small and large states, are no longer present.

But the recent conclusion of the Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan casts doubt on whether "sphere of influence" is really just one for the history books. On the battlefield, the six-week war has shown a clear winner. The Azeri forces, with their Turkish drones and military training, have managed to quickly break through Armenian defenses and thrust deep into formerly Armenian controlled territories. The end of the war saw the capitulation of all Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh after complete demoralization and the near-complete destruction of all military hardware available to continue fighting.

However, the end of the war agreement, despite Azeri celebrations, is not one that reflects the extent of Azeri victories in the ground war. Instead of receiving all of Nagorno-Karabakh back, as was the original intent of the war, Azerbaijan controls only the southern half of it as per the agreement, with the northern half under the control of a Russian peacekeeping force that is set to replace the Armenian military presence. At the urging of its ally Turkey, the Azeri leadership accepted the terms of the agreement, just as the Armenian one, despite street protests now raging across the country demand the "traitor" prime minister to resign.

Indeed, an even closer look at the peace agreement shows that it is not Armenia or Azerbaijan, but Russia, that is the biggest winner from the end of the war. Aside from establishing a permanent military presence in the middle of the Caucasus that checks any overt anti-Russian moves in the future, it has clearly weakened a pro-Western Armenian government that came to power in 2018 after massive street protests that took down the past pro-Russian leadership. Armenian attempts to grow closer to the West has now been checked as the general public turned against pro-Western leaders for military weakness.

Russian strategic victory in the Nagorno-Karabakh war is part of its larger negotiations with Turkey on how to divide up the control of their respective backyards. The Turks gained much militarily and politically by proving the superiority of their military hardware and training provided to the Azeri forces, in the process reinforcing pro-Turkish sentiments among the Azeri leadership and general public. As recognition of the role Turkey played in the war, it received observer status over Russian peacekeeping in Nagorno-Karabakh as well as control over a new transport corridor that goes from Azerbaijan proper into Turkey through Armenia.

The benefits of that transport corridor for Russia and Turkey is immense. As Iran remains under US sanctions and China pushing ahead with the Belt and Road Initiative beyond its immediate neighborhood, the route through Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey will be a key conduit for overland trade between Central Asia, Middle East, and Europe. Both Russia and Turkey stand to benefit by taking a cut of whatever trade that flow through the route, and turn their control of the route into geopolitical leverage against Europe and China by threatening to choke off the trade flows as needed.

The Russo-Turkish alignment in the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh war is only one part of the return of the concept of "sphere of influence" in modern politics. Russia retained its control over the behavior of Aremnia, while Turkey did the same with Azerbaijan. Neither states has been able to refuse the Russian-brokered peace agreement despite clear disadvtange to national interests from signing it. The agreement allowed Turkey and Russia to relegate the two combatants to the position of client states and achieve strategic objectives without directly occupying any land in the process.

The same scene is being replicated in northern Syria, Libya, and beyond. The complete absence of the US and EU in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as many other hotspots across the Middle East, ensure that Turkey and Russia, as the two premier regional powers, negotiate to craft their own status quo. The two remain rivals but are bound by mutual agreement to maximize self-interest first by keeping out Western influence in the region. Their success in doing so in Nagorno-Karabakh and possibly many other conflicts to come shows that "sphere of influence" is making a comeback to the geopolitics of Eurasia.