A Dystopian Policy for Mass Migration in Japan
The Japanese are, by now, famous in the developed world for the hostility of the general public toward the prospect of mass migration. Even as the government mulls policies that increase the number of foreign workers in the country, the media, both mainstream and otherwise, debate whether the shift to the extreme right under in way in Europe is a result of uncoordinated, unstructured, and unprepared nature by which millions of Africans and Middle Easterners streamed in. What is implied, of course, is that the Japanese do not repeat the mistake of mass migration that the Europeans brought upon themselves.
Setting aside the morality and humanitarianism about accepting refugees and even opportunity-deprived economic migrants for a minute. Migration, ultimately, is a political question, and as such, in democratic states such as some European states and Japan, the hostility of the general public toward mass migration matters for future prospects of accepting more migrants. People in these countries care about helping foreigners escaping the risk of death and poverty, but they fundamentally care more about how the migrants affect themselves, whether their lives and societies will be detrimentally impacted by more migrants.
The inability of the incumbent governments in European states like Germany and Italy to reassure voting citizens that migrants can bring more good than harm to them on an individual basis and that any harm that is done by the presence of migrants, whether economically or socioculturally, can be resolved by state policies, is what is ultimately driving the rise of anti-immigrant far right. Far right parties do not seek to better address how to resolve to balance the good and bad of mass migration; they simply assume that the state and society do not and will not have the capacity to mitigate the harm of migration. Thus a more closed border is optimal.
While such a logic of the far right on the topic of migration is finding more adherents in Europe, the same logic has always been dominant in Japan. The Japanese mainstream supports the idea that the country is too socioculturally unique and contain too many idiosyncratic unwritten social rules that foreigners simply do not understand and cannot quickly acculturate. And since the uniqueness and unwritten rules are what makes Japan safe, ordered, and efficient, more clueless migrants who cannot be properly taught just means a Japan that sees its beneficial sociocultural norms breaking apart.
The question is how to get the Japanese mainstream to support more foreigners living in Japan while working with the deep-set anti-immigration mentality. In an extremely dystopian way, migration in the wealthy Arab States of the Persian Gulf provides inspiration. The likes of Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia have long depended on foreign professionals and menial laborers to keep their entire societies operational. Foreigners make up the demographic majority, but there is very little popular opposition to such a massive presence of foreigners, who certainly have gone against the sociocultural norms of conservative Muslim citizens.
The lack of political opposition to migrants in the Gulf stems from the lack of rights foreigners have in those countries. Not only is work visa tied to job offers, but foreigners also do not enjoy the lavish social welfare citizens enjoy. Foreigners have no right to become permanent residents or citizens, and in many cases, cannot bring their families from back home to the host society. Many foreigners live in employer-designated domiciles, creating a geographic separation between the citizens and foreigners. The fruits of the foreigners' work, in terms of extra taxes and services, disproportionately benefit citizens.
As eyebrow-raising as the idea sound, if mass migration were to take root in Japan, "the Gulf model" is likely the most politically palatable. In fact, given the difference between Japan and the Gulf, the Japanese migration regime might need to be even stricter. For instance, unlike the Gulf where mobility depends on cars that poor migrants do not have, migrants in Japan can move easily, irritating many Japanese who do not want to see foreigners in their neighborhoods. The solution can be internal passports issued to migrants, restricting their free movements in the country and tying them to only locales where they live and work.
Perhaps implementing internal passport will not satisfy many Japanese, who argue the costs to society and government of having to "clean up" after migrants who cannot follow the rules. Perhaps such people can be plicated with the implementation of much higher taxes for migrants. If foreigners pay income, consumption, and property taxes that are several times higher than Japanese citizens, then the government can argue that the extra revenue can not only be enough to "clean up" after the migrants but even have some left over to boost social welfare for the Japanese.
In essence, migrants under such a policy regime will be formally and legally branded "second-class residents" with fewer rights and access to public goods, even as they pay higher taxes. It is inhumane but politically effective, since citizens overwhelmingly benefit, while migrants, with no political voice locally, are in no position to oppose. If the government can make some notable exceptions to the rule for high-profile migrant groups, then it is even possible to get away with implementation without too much vocal opposition from international human rights groups. Either way, the idea is worth a ponder in the current global political climate.
Setting aside the morality and humanitarianism about accepting refugees and even opportunity-deprived economic migrants for a minute. Migration, ultimately, is a political question, and as such, in democratic states such as some European states and Japan, the hostility of the general public toward mass migration matters for future prospects of accepting more migrants. People in these countries care about helping foreigners escaping the risk of death and poverty, but they fundamentally care more about how the migrants affect themselves, whether their lives and societies will be detrimentally impacted by more migrants.
The inability of the incumbent governments in European states like Germany and Italy to reassure voting citizens that migrants can bring more good than harm to them on an individual basis and that any harm that is done by the presence of migrants, whether economically or socioculturally, can be resolved by state policies, is what is ultimately driving the rise of anti-immigrant far right. Far right parties do not seek to better address how to resolve to balance the good and bad of mass migration; they simply assume that the state and society do not and will not have the capacity to mitigate the harm of migration. Thus a more closed border is optimal.
While such a logic of the far right on the topic of migration is finding more adherents in Europe, the same logic has always been dominant in Japan. The Japanese mainstream supports the idea that the country is too socioculturally unique and contain too many idiosyncratic unwritten social rules that foreigners simply do not understand and cannot quickly acculturate. And since the uniqueness and unwritten rules are what makes Japan safe, ordered, and efficient, more clueless migrants who cannot be properly taught just means a Japan that sees its beneficial sociocultural norms breaking apart.
The question is how to get the Japanese mainstream to support more foreigners living in Japan while working with the deep-set anti-immigration mentality. In an extremely dystopian way, migration in the wealthy Arab States of the Persian Gulf provides inspiration. The likes of Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia have long depended on foreign professionals and menial laborers to keep their entire societies operational. Foreigners make up the demographic majority, but there is very little popular opposition to such a massive presence of foreigners, who certainly have gone against the sociocultural norms of conservative Muslim citizens.
The lack of political opposition to migrants in the Gulf stems from the lack of rights foreigners have in those countries. Not only is work visa tied to job offers, but foreigners also do not enjoy the lavish social welfare citizens enjoy. Foreigners have no right to become permanent residents or citizens, and in many cases, cannot bring their families from back home to the host society. Many foreigners live in employer-designated domiciles, creating a geographic separation between the citizens and foreigners. The fruits of the foreigners' work, in terms of extra taxes and services, disproportionately benefit citizens.
As eyebrow-raising as the idea sound, if mass migration were to take root in Japan, "the Gulf model" is likely the most politically palatable. In fact, given the difference between Japan and the Gulf, the Japanese migration regime might need to be even stricter. For instance, unlike the Gulf where mobility depends on cars that poor migrants do not have, migrants in Japan can move easily, irritating many Japanese who do not want to see foreigners in their neighborhoods. The solution can be internal passports issued to migrants, restricting their free movements in the country and tying them to only locales where they live and work.
Perhaps implementing internal passport will not satisfy many Japanese, who argue the costs to society and government of having to "clean up" after migrants who cannot follow the rules. Perhaps such people can be plicated with the implementation of much higher taxes for migrants. If foreigners pay income, consumption, and property taxes that are several times higher than Japanese citizens, then the government can argue that the extra revenue can not only be enough to "clean up" after the migrants but even have some left over to boost social welfare for the Japanese.
In essence, migrants under such a policy regime will be formally and legally branded "second-class residents" with fewer rights and access to public goods, even as they pay higher taxes. It is inhumane but politically effective, since citizens overwhelmingly benefit, while migrants, with no political voice locally, are in no position to oppose. If the government can make some notable exceptions to the rule for high-profile migrant groups, then it is even possible to get away with implementation without too much vocal opposition from international human rights groups. Either way, the idea is worth a ponder in the current global political climate.
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