Astana, the capital city of Kazakhstan, is in many ways the city of its president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Having came up with the idea of creating a brand new city to replace Almaty, the economic hub of more than a million people, as capital of the country, he certainly did not hesitate to put his own imprints on the city itself. The city's new airport, university, several other institutions are unabashedly named after him, while the main museums all have sections exclusively dedicated to his life and politics.
All the visible presence of Nazarbayev in Astana smacks of a clear cult of personality, and many foreign observers may be quick to criticize the waste of country's precise resources to construct the new city more or less associated with the president. However this blog is not keen on evaluating whether the visible projection of his own image by Nazarbayev is good or bad. There just is not enough evidence to suggest the damage done to the country through his self-promoting efforts.
If anything, the decades independent Kazakhstan fared under stewardship of Nazarbayev has been quite well, especially when compared to fellow Central Asian countries that fell into economic decline and straight up civil wars. Multiethnic harmony has remained stable, while distribution of wealth from exploiting natural resources has been fair enough to not agitate any particular segment of the population to demand greater shares. Nazarbayev has every reason to receive the loyalty of the people.
However, the more popular support the president for life gets from the people could in turn weaken the state. The success of the polity is now associated with the wisdom and ability of the individual leader, who further propagates and cements such belief through a cult of personality. As in the case of Kazakhstan, the act of nation building has become more and more dependent on actions of the individual leader, rather than deliberations within state institutions.
Yet, no wise leader can remain in place forever. By being too busy providing excellent leadership for his country, the president for life neglects the equally important task of training a successor who is not only just as capable but can also immediately move forward with popular support should something happens to incapacitate the current leader. Visible cult of personality, in essence, prevents the process from even starting by making it impossible for the masses to imagine a leader other than the current one.
Thus, taking on personal branding projects like building a new capital city presents an opportunity cost for the long-term leader. If he chooses to strengthen his political position, popular support, and future legacy now, he would in tandem sacrifices the opportunities for future leaders to emerge that can rule the country independently without relying blindly on the previous leader's legacy. An existing cult of personality forces future leaders to either overturn it or suck up to it in order to rule effectively.
History shows that neither goes well. Uzbekistan is an example of the former. President Karimov's death put an end to his cult of personality. His successors, to walk out of Karimov's shadows, had to create their own cults of personality, expending even more resources of the state for political prestige. Venezuela is example of the latter. Maduro decided to use Chavez to cement his own legitimacy, only to become convinced that Chavez's popular support is greater than harsh economic realities on the ground.
The transition from one president for life to another leader can only be tumultuous. The more popular, successful, and visible the previous leader is, the more difficult it would be future future leaders to establish their own legitimacy. Their attempts to rule independently without influences of the previous leader leads to extreme political actions that can cost anything between billions of dollars wasted in political projects that can be spent more productively, to complete economic ruin and political divisiveness.
It is a lesson for all political leaders seeking to extend their rules indefinitely through cults of personality. They personally may be successful, but their own success will only be overshadowed by future failures that they themselves set up inadvertently. Instead of extending their own years in office, they should be training protégé that can effectively carry out their beliefs and values without having to have themselves remain in office for more than needed.
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