What's the Point of Negotiating When Agreements Can Just be Ripped up Later?
One summer of 2008, the author found himself on a bus from South Korea, crossing straight across the DMZ north into the North Korean city of Kaesong. It was a different time, when hopes of reconciliation between the two Koreas was high. Hyundai Asan, a subsidiary of the giant South Korean conglomerate ran the tour, and the bus passed through Kaesong Industrial Complex, the symbol of economic cooperation between the two sides. While tourists are monitored per usual protocol, there were talks of a better future among the South Koreans used to living under liberal administrations.
The current bout of optimism that reflect inter-Korean relations remind of those heady days a full decade ago. South Korea is once again under left-wing leadership, after years under conservatives that demonized the North. The border at DMZ once again buzzed with activities, years after shooting of South Korean tourists saw cross-border tourism shut, followed by the symbolic industrial complex in Kaesong. Meeting between leaders of the two sides have in turn led to dramatic scramble in the diplomatic community. Meetings among Korean, Chinese, American, and Japanese leaders push forward the development.
None are more headlining than the summit between Trump and Kim Jong-un in Singapore, The North Korean desire to sit down one on one with the US is finally fulfilled, and the US has a shot in finally restrain the rogue state without having to go through capricious maneuverings of Beijing and Seoul. But at such a pivotal moment, US diplomatic reputation just hit a low, with Trump's voluntary withdrawal from the multilateral Iran nuclear deal negotiated under Obama. The Middle East is once again thrown into uncertainty as the elated Israelis wasted no time bombing Iranian installations afterwards.
Trump's rash withdrawal from the Iran deal cast a dark shadow upon the upcoming bilateral negotiations in Singapore. There is still hope that something concrete can come out of it, but now there is fear that whatever achieved in the summit can be quickly reversed by either or both sides when circumstances change. If Trump can rip up the Iranian deal without agreements of other international partners, he can certainly do the same with a North Korean deal. As Obama mentioned in a recent Facebook post, the damage to American credibility from exiting the Iran deal, no matter how imperfect it is, reverberates across different issues.
And the foremost detrimental effect of Trump's diplomatic capriciousness maybe the encouraging effect on the North Koreans' own unpredictability. The Kim family is known for going back and forth on negotiated deals when the situation suits. Hyundai Asan's North Korea tours and the Kaesong Industrial Complex both could not have happened without North Korean official approval. When the situation changed and that approval is withdrawn, both were shut down with huge economic damages to South Koreans involved. Such reneging will only be emboldened by America doing the same.
The uncertainty of whether negotiated agreements will "stick" over time, then, makes the exercise of negotiating it more of a political public stunt for both sides rather than any genuine aspiration to resolve the problem at hand. For Trump, attending summits with North Korea show results that his supposed tough stance on America's enemies is working. Concrete outputs like getting American captives in North Korea freed will no doubt shore up domestic popular support for at least his foreign policy platform, wehn domestic issues are continuing to divide public opinions.
On the North Korean side, years of heavy investments in nuclear weapons have come to the point where its possession is already a fait accompli. It has come for time to use it as a genuine bargaining chip for the country to recover from increasingly tightened foreign sanctions. Any concessions that can be extracted immediately from the Americans, especially in terms of aid and reporning of trade, can help keep public anger toward the regime in check. Abandoning knowledge of how to create nuclear weapons, even when weapons and manufacturing facilities are given up, would be a nonstarter.
For both sides, the goals of the negotiations should be short terms benefits, while keeping the public hopes up for longer ones. The structure of the Iran deal, buoyed by beliefs that somehow it will see to gradual reduction of Iranian nuclear arsenal over years and decades, have shown the sheer naivety of media reports and the general public consuming those reports. The reality is much less optimistic. Deals agreed today can be destroyed tomorrow for someone's political interests. Therefore it is just better to keep expectations low and any practical gains short-term.
The current bout of optimism that reflect inter-Korean relations remind of those heady days a full decade ago. South Korea is once again under left-wing leadership, after years under conservatives that demonized the North. The border at DMZ once again buzzed with activities, years after shooting of South Korean tourists saw cross-border tourism shut, followed by the symbolic industrial complex in Kaesong. Meeting between leaders of the two sides have in turn led to dramatic scramble in the diplomatic community. Meetings among Korean, Chinese, American, and Japanese leaders push forward the development.
None are more headlining than the summit between Trump and Kim Jong-un in Singapore, The North Korean desire to sit down one on one with the US is finally fulfilled, and the US has a shot in finally restrain the rogue state without having to go through capricious maneuverings of Beijing and Seoul. But at such a pivotal moment, US diplomatic reputation just hit a low, with Trump's voluntary withdrawal from the multilateral Iran nuclear deal negotiated under Obama. The Middle East is once again thrown into uncertainty as the elated Israelis wasted no time bombing Iranian installations afterwards.
Trump's rash withdrawal from the Iran deal cast a dark shadow upon the upcoming bilateral negotiations in Singapore. There is still hope that something concrete can come out of it, but now there is fear that whatever achieved in the summit can be quickly reversed by either or both sides when circumstances change. If Trump can rip up the Iranian deal without agreements of other international partners, he can certainly do the same with a North Korean deal. As Obama mentioned in a recent Facebook post, the damage to American credibility from exiting the Iran deal, no matter how imperfect it is, reverberates across different issues.
And the foremost detrimental effect of Trump's diplomatic capriciousness maybe the encouraging effect on the North Koreans' own unpredictability. The Kim family is known for going back and forth on negotiated deals when the situation suits. Hyundai Asan's North Korea tours and the Kaesong Industrial Complex both could not have happened without North Korean official approval. When the situation changed and that approval is withdrawn, both were shut down with huge economic damages to South Koreans involved. Such reneging will only be emboldened by America doing the same.
The uncertainty of whether negotiated agreements will "stick" over time, then, makes the exercise of negotiating it more of a political public stunt for both sides rather than any genuine aspiration to resolve the problem at hand. For Trump, attending summits with North Korea show results that his supposed tough stance on America's enemies is working. Concrete outputs like getting American captives in North Korea freed will no doubt shore up domestic popular support for at least his foreign policy platform, wehn domestic issues are continuing to divide public opinions.
On the North Korean side, years of heavy investments in nuclear weapons have come to the point where its possession is already a fait accompli. It has come for time to use it as a genuine bargaining chip for the country to recover from increasingly tightened foreign sanctions. Any concessions that can be extracted immediately from the Americans, especially in terms of aid and reporning of trade, can help keep public anger toward the regime in check. Abandoning knowledge of how to create nuclear weapons, even when weapons and manufacturing facilities are given up, would be a nonstarter.
For both sides, the goals of the negotiations should be short terms benefits, while keeping the public hopes up for longer ones. The structure of the Iran deal, buoyed by beliefs that somehow it will see to gradual reduction of Iranian nuclear arsenal over years and decades, have shown the sheer naivety of media reports and the general public consuming those reports. The reality is much less optimistic. Deals agreed today can be destroyed tomorrow for someone's political interests. Therefore it is just better to keep expectations low and any practical gains short-term.
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