Institutional Robustness as a Prerequisite for Democratic Maturity
The ongoing political stalemate in Thailand, entering an even grander stage of opposition protests and incumbent counter-protests to paralyze Bangkok, seems to see no end. Fueled by continued anger over talks of inappropriate use of national funds, hidden corruption, and unjustifiable grips on political power by the so-called "Thaksin regime", the opposition seems to still have plenty of firepower left despite private murmurs among its supporters that they are pushing too far with their demands, and that their lives are increasingly being disrupted by the constant need to be on the streets.
Come to think of it, after tracking the issue on the ground in Bangkok during a recent trip, as well as tracking the reports from various media outlets, the author feels that a major dimension of the ongoing conflict has been largely neglected by both the participants and the observers during the entire process. While raging battles of words and mass rallies on the actions of the government and the socio-political issues that are causing the increasing bipolarity is brought to the forefront of global attention, little has been discussed on the effect of the fiasco on the political system itself.
One online commentator made an extreme good point: "Without the Democrats or the Shinawatras, the Kingdom of Thailand will survive...but their actions will largely impact how the Kingdom will be governed in the future." Indeed, it should be noted that what is really central to the conflicts is not who is right or wrong, who has the true support of the people, or even what policies ought to be implemented that can truly benefit the nation as a whole. Instead, it is how leaders of both sides project and maintain their political ideals in a situation that is being accepted as a "new normal."
In other words, the most frightening aspect of the ongoing conflict, for the common people, is not whether one side will win and obliterate the other, but the ease at which both sides are hijacking the normal democratic process for their own perceived self-interests of consolidating national political power, legitimatizing, not only for their own supporters today but undoubtedly for future generations of politicians, mass mob-based movements as publicly-supported, royally-sanctioned orthodox methods for gaining political power in a democratic setting.
More so than the welfare of people (as claimed by both sides), what is really under threat in Thailand is a social consensus, both among elites and populists, politicians and voters, that upholds smooth and peaceful democratic institutions as the basis for the country's political system and method for choosing leaders. The longer the ongoing war of attrition lasts, the more people will recognize the political gridlock (not to mention the associated economic damages) as a new status quo, making such behavior legitimate for future political leaders.
After all, democratic institutions, most importantly free and fair elections, the results of which are accepted by the defeated who then peacefully and graciously bows out to fight another, cannot be taken for granted. These institutions can only continue to exist if those who violate their codes of conduct are swiftly criticized and punished for their actions. Institutions and their governing guidelines are created by people to restrain themselves. If the majority refuse to subject themselves to the constraints, then the institution would quickly dissolve itself.
Of course, this is not a problem that limit itself to Thailand but is instead prevalent in most of the world's so-called "fragile democracies." A collective refusal to follow the basic rules of leadership transition through the ballot box reinforces a culture of political impatience, in which political parties expend efforts primarily not on how to garner more support from different segments of the national constituency through effective reforms in their own policy platforms and ideologies, but on how to quickly bring about downfall of their opponents on incessant mudslinging.
This should be primary lesson from the gridlocked streets of Bangkok for young and unstable democracies everywhere. Bypassing regular electoral processes and resorting to mass actions may propel one to global attention and even moral high ground that inspire widespread sympathy and support in the short term, but in the long term, such actions, especially if they succeed in intended goals, will undoubtedly destroy the very institutions that support liberal pluralism of political ideas in an ordered and structured environment. A people who cannot sustain its needed institutions cannot have, nor deserve, sustained democracy.
Come to think of it, after tracking the issue on the ground in Bangkok during a recent trip, as well as tracking the reports from various media outlets, the author feels that a major dimension of the ongoing conflict has been largely neglected by both the participants and the observers during the entire process. While raging battles of words and mass rallies on the actions of the government and the socio-political issues that are causing the increasing bipolarity is brought to the forefront of global attention, little has been discussed on the effect of the fiasco on the political system itself.
One online commentator made an extreme good point: "Without the Democrats or the Shinawatras, the Kingdom of Thailand will survive...but their actions will largely impact how the Kingdom will be governed in the future." Indeed, it should be noted that what is really central to the conflicts is not who is right or wrong, who has the true support of the people, or even what policies ought to be implemented that can truly benefit the nation as a whole. Instead, it is how leaders of both sides project and maintain their political ideals in a situation that is being accepted as a "new normal."
In other words, the most frightening aspect of the ongoing conflict, for the common people, is not whether one side will win and obliterate the other, but the ease at which both sides are hijacking the normal democratic process for their own perceived self-interests of consolidating national political power, legitimatizing, not only for their own supporters today but undoubtedly for future generations of politicians, mass mob-based movements as publicly-supported, royally-sanctioned orthodox methods for gaining political power in a democratic setting.
More so than the welfare of people (as claimed by both sides), what is really under threat in Thailand is a social consensus, both among elites and populists, politicians and voters, that upholds smooth and peaceful democratic institutions as the basis for the country's political system and method for choosing leaders. The longer the ongoing war of attrition lasts, the more people will recognize the political gridlock (not to mention the associated economic damages) as a new status quo, making such behavior legitimate for future political leaders.
After all, democratic institutions, most importantly free and fair elections, the results of which are accepted by the defeated who then peacefully and graciously bows out to fight another, cannot be taken for granted. These institutions can only continue to exist if those who violate their codes of conduct are swiftly criticized and punished for their actions. Institutions and their governing guidelines are created by people to restrain themselves. If the majority refuse to subject themselves to the constraints, then the institution would quickly dissolve itself.
Of course, this is not a problem that limit itself to Thailand but is instead prevalent in most of the world's so-called "fragile democracies." A collective refusal to follow the basic rules of leadership transition through the ballot box reinforces a culture of political impatience, in which political parties expend efforts primarily not on how to garner more support from different segments of the national constituency through effective reforms in their own policy platforms and ideologies, but on how to quickly bring about downfall of their opponents on incessant mudslinging.
This should be primary lesson from the gridlocked streets of Bangkok for young and unstable democracies everywhere. Bypassing regular electoral processes and resorting to mass actions may propel one to global attention and even moral high ground that inspire widespread sympathy and support in the short term, but in the long term, such actions, especially if they succeed in intended goals, will undoubtedly destroy the very institutions that support liberal pluralism of political ideas in an ordered and structured environment. A people who cannot sustain its needed institutions cannot have, nor deserve, sustained democracy.
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