Peter Magyar will need to calibrate how much he leads Hungary away from Chinese investments

Western liberals rejoiced when Victor Orban, the prime minister of Hungary for the last decade and a half, was finally thrown out of office recently, despite persistently tilting the field to his favor through monopolizing mainstream media and gerrymandering electoral districts to dilute opposition votes. Peter Magyar, the incoming prime minister, immediately called for a complete overhaul of the state broadcaster and rescinding Hungary's opposition to the EU's further funding of Ukrainian war efforts. Brussels seemed to have lost an enemy and gained an ally.

The very fact that Magyar achieved a victory despite public endorsement from the Trump administration and the Russian disinformation machine shows how much popular will, when overwhelming, can stop democratic backsliding. But while many liberal outlets sounded the death knell of xenophobic nationalism that Orban (and by extension, Putin, Trump, and a whole host of similarly extremist European far-right parties) espouses, the reality is a bit messier. On the campaign trail, Magyar avoided ideological talk, instead focusing on bread-and-butter issues.

But to say that Hungary's low-growth economic reality and its political ideology are entirely separate matters is also disingenuous. Orban's Eurosceptic vision has led to a divergent economic trajectory with fellow EU members. Hungary doubled down on the import of Russian gas, while others reduced their reliance. And even more importantly, it courted Chinese investments, in the form of electric vehicle and battery factories, that others shunned for the fear of economic overreliance and national security risks. Chinese firms responded positively, establishing Hungary as a beachhead for entry into the EU market.

It is tough for Magyar to suddenly veer away from these economic commitments. Many of these deals are certainly shrouded in regulatory murkiness that defines the intransparent ways that Orban married politics with cronyism, but at least in the short term, these investments are a rare bright spot for Hungary as it seeks to find more sustainable growth and increase citizens' standards of living. It is unsurprising, then, that one of the first speeches that Magyar made after his election was to reassure foreign investors that the country remains as welcoming as before. 

Frankly, he might have little choice but to signal that continued commitment to investors. In the days after the Hungarian elections, Ruman Radev, another Eurosceptic in the Orban mold, won a thumping victory in the Bulgarian parliamentary elections. Should Magyar fail to impress, the Russians and the Chinese will gladly take their investments to Bulgaria, or anywhere else with EU membership and a government that is willing to bend some rules. Magyar cannot afford to alienate when the alternative is losing to direct competitors.

At the same time, he will need to keep an eye on the long-term benefits of heaving closely to Chinese investments. A recent half-marathon in Beijing featured a humanoid robot that beat humans in times, only a year after a similar event showed robots struggling to finish the race at all. The breathtaking technological advance should not be lost on Eurocrats, anxious about how the continent is falling behind in the race to lead next-generation cutting-edge innovation. Without the financial resources for R&D, countries like Hungary can piggyback on Chinese ones through the EU's market power. 

Of course, given that Magyar has yet to take office, it is difficult to say how much of his supposed liberal, pro-growth credentials will carry into actual policymaking and governance. But what is for sure is that much of what he campaigned for, fixing the economy while being pro-European, will face constraints and trade-offs largely outside his and Hungary's control. Just like a Chinese robot that took years to cross the finish line after countless times of falling on its face, Magyar will need plenty of trial and error to figure out the most ideologically and economically palatable stance.

That is perhaps an even more important reason for outsiders to keep track of his performance in the years to come. De-Orbanizing Hungary will surely feature largely in Western media, as they evaluate how much he fulfills his promise of strengthening democratic institutions. But as he tries to satisfy them, as well as voters sensitive to economic conditions and Eurocrats seeking more alignment, he will need to pioneer a new model, particularly of how to keep a small country relevant and prosperous. How he handles Chinese investments may be a good bellwether.