Can the Elimination of Official Ethnic Designations Help Resolve China's Ethnicity-Related Discriminations

For a publication that is known for supporting liberal causes, most important of all the respect of human rights around the world, the Economist can be highly pragmatic. The magazine argued for institutionalizing international migrants as second class citizens in their host societies to placate the worst tendencies of anti-immigration xenophobia that has made headlines in many recipient countries. Setting aside the discussion on whether systematically introducing bureaucratic and economic inequalities between migrants and "natives" contradicts the principle of universal human rights, one should not doubt that the Economist values practical solutions over lofty ideals in dealing with real-world issues.

That sense of pragmatism extends to the issue of ethnic conflicts that plague multiethnic states with weak central governments. Notably, in the case of Ethiopia, where political reforms have opened a powderkeg of long-simmering sense of resentment among the country's largest tribal groups, the Economist suggested the country start by getting rid of ethnicity-based political administration units that create a false sense of "ethnic homeland" with concrete boundaries, even though people of all backgrounds live together in every geography. The magazine also encouraged the government to look into deleting ethnicity from national ID cards and other records to erase any easy way to mark out a person in case of ethnic conflict.

While the Economist's suggestions were specifically formulated for the case of Ethiopia, there can potentially be some universal applicability in its suggestions for all multiethnic countries suffering from interethnic conflicts. After all, in discussions of its suggestions, the Economist implies that ethnicity is a fluid and often socially manufactured concept, especially when it comes to land ownership. As is the case for Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, major cities in many multiethnic countries are becoming a magnet for domestic migrants from across the country given their outsized economic opportunities, making it fruitless to discuss what land belongs to what ethnicity.

The suggestions put forth by the Economist is particularly relevant in China, where official designations of ethnic groups have not only enabled easy identification through national identity cards but widespread policy discrimination among different ethnicities, for better or worse. While officially recognized non-Han people in the country have benefited from an exemption from family planning, targetted for extra spending for poverty elimination, and benefitted from affirmative action policies in education and hiring, many more, as exemplified by the Uyghurs and Tibetans, have faced severe restrictions on their personal and socioeconomic freedoms simply because of their ethnic designation.

The fact that the Chinese general public, the vast majority of whom is Han, has tacitly approved the ill-treatment of other ethnicities illustrates the danger of ethnic designations. By introducing clear boundaries between "us" and "them" as part of socialization from a young age, the average Chinese citizen has become unconsciously conditioned to think in ethnic groupings, so that the ill-treatment is seen as only "their" problem happening only on "their" lands that stem from "their" willingness to hurt "us" through terrorist attacks and other violent activities. The lack of sympathy, in other words, stems from a social distance placed among the different ethnicities, stemming at least partly from the clear designation of one ethnicity for each individual.

Thought this way, the erasure of official ethnic designation on identity cards and political-administrative units may help in reducing both public approval for social background-based human rights abuses as well as the justification for government authorities to target certain social groups. Given that most Chinese citizens, irrespective of their official ethnic designations, have Chinese names and speak Mandarin, a lack of ethnic designations would prevent easy identification that leads to discrimination against non-Han individuals both in their daily lives and a more systemic level.

Of course, ending official ethnic designation can only do so much when some peoples, like the Uyghurs, are easily distinguishable based on their looks, religion, and non-Chinese names. Yet, even here, the lack of ethnic designation can be the first step to promote greater integration of such ethnic communities and the Han majority, on a more organic, egalitarian, gradual, and non-coercive basis. Harking back to the Economist's implied belief in ethnic fluidity, the lack of official ethnic designation may spare people of mixed origins and backgrounds from having to only take one identity when they are clearly much more.

Indeed, policymaking can even help nurture ethnic fluidity by officially recognize the multiple sociocultural identities of individual citizens. More flexible identity cards may allow individuals to register more than one name, recognizing the different naming traditions of different ethnicities. And policies can shift social divisions, and thus political focus, away from ethnic designations to more problem-oriented ones, including income level, employment status, and educational background. While those alternative designations would no doubt bring their own problems, at least they are somewhat more changeable based on individual effort, unlike the born-with concept of ethnicity.