The second summit between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump in Hanoi has concluded in a rather ominous way. Gone is the optimism that emerged from the previous summit in Singapore, when both men spoke of concrete progress toward peace, with denuclearization, ending of sanctions, and official diplomatic relations all on the future agenda. The Hanoi summit was, in contrast, more notable for what it did not manage to achieve: the promises of further progress on denuclearization and dropping of sanctions were dashed by disagreements on defining what they are.
What does the future hold for the North Korean issue as the Hanoi talks fall apart? Unfortunately, one has no choice but to be pessimistic. After all, it could be argued that the entire premise of the two men agreeing to meet one another is rooted in their respective needs to speak to their domestic audiences. Trump needs to credit himself with concrete foreign policy achievements given his penchant for ripping up arrangements made by Obama. As he reduces American involvements in Iran, NATO, and the world as a whole, he needs to use North Korea to prove that his isolationist tendencies work as an effective foreign policy instrument.
As for Kim, meeting with Trump demonstrate to the domestic audience of his international stature that directly contradicts the unconcealable reality of his country being an economic minnow with little sustained foreign influence. Having a majority international public moment with Trump shows Kim to be a globally respected statesman. Such a moment, broadcast to the domestic audience, provides Kim with the justification to continue his confrontational and isolationist policy. By bringing Trump to the negotiation table, he proved the effectiveness of his policy on the international stage.
Yet, if the domestic audiences are the targets of the talks, then holding more and more detailed meetings with more and more targetted and specific contents do not really add that much value to the agenda of either Kim or Trump. Publicity can be gained only with a few photos, and two meetings held a few months apart already proved that what happened in Singapore is not just an irregularity but a sustained diplomatic effort. Simply said, having more meetings in and after Hanoi would be a waste of time for both men who already achieved their domestic aims in the two summits.
Given that further meetings are no longer needed, it is very likely to see both men using the breakdown of the Hanoi summit as a way to reorient their foreign policies toward one that helps them achieve their next objectives. The fact that they can both portray the other side as being uncooperative and unwilling to compromise to achieve lasting peace provide both with the needed fodder to pander to their respective nationalistic elements at home, without seeming to betray whatever bilateral goodwill built from the two summits.
And pander to national interests they both will to face down nationalist elements that called the summits a waste of time to begin with and unable to change the fundamental relationship between the two countries and the entire dynamics surrounding the North Korean issue. Extricated from the need to continue playing publicity stunts through summitry, both Kim and Trump can now openly agree with the nationalists that, due to the other side being uncooperative, the results from the summits are minimal and they can try something more hardline in order to move the needle on outstanding issues.
The world is bound to be worse off when both Kim and Trump start moving together with their respective nationalist elements. On the US side, the precedent is already there. When Trump pulled out of Obama-era agreements with Iran, he signaled that the US government reserves the right to pull out of any signed deals that no longer feels like a good deal later. The uncertainty associated with whether Trump will stick to any terms means that anything concrete that came out of Singapore and Hanoi meetings, however trivial, can be overturned, resulting in a return to the pre-summit hostilities.
On the Kim side, Trump's unwillingness to compromise in Hanoi provides the perfect excuse to double down on its "self-reliance" strategy underpinned by hostility toward the US. US's uncompromising attitude in Hanoi becomes the centerpiece for continuing the discourse on American efforts to prevent North Korean development as the central reason behind the country's economic struggles. With the discourse validated, Kim can then focus both on cementing his larger-than-life image at home as being capable of moving the country forward despite continued American hostility.
The outcome is likely a renewed battle of words between the two men and the two governments. Yet, it should not be seen as a failure of the two bilateral meetings, but the changing circumstances associated with their successful conclusions, seen from the domestic agenda of the two leaders. Now that the summits are over, the two are ready to focus more on those dissatisfied with the summits and more ready for confrontation. As Kim and Trump acquiesce with the demands for confrontation, it is lasting peace, the original goal of the summits, that will be sacrificed.
What does the future hold for the North Korean issue as the Hanoi talks fall apart? Unfortunately, one has no choice but to be pessimistic. After all, it could be argued that the entire premise of the two men agreeing to meet one another is rooted in their respective needs to speak to their domestic audiences. Trump needs to credit himself with concrete foreign policy achievements given his penchant for ripping up arrangements made by Obama. As he reduces American involvements in Iran, NATO, and the world as a whole, he needs to use North Korea to prove that his isolationist tendencies work as an effective foreign policy instrument.
As for Kim, meeting with Trump demonstrate to the domestic audience of his international stature that directly contradicts the unconcealable reality of his country being an economic minnow with little sustained foreign influence. Having a majority international public moment with Trump shows Kim to be a globally respected statesman. Such a moment, broadcast to the domestic audience, provides Kim with the justification to continue his confrontational and isolationist policy. By bringing Trump to the negotiation table, he proved the effectiveness of his policy on the international stage.
Yet, if the domestic audiences are the targets of the talks, then holding more and more detailed meetings with more and more targetted and specific contents do not really add that much value to the agenda of either Kim or Trump. Publicity can be gained only with a few photos, and two meetings held a few months apart already proved that what happened in Singapore is not just an irregularity but a sustained diplomatic effort. Simply said, having more meetings in and after Hanoi would be a waste of time for both men who already achieved their domestic aims in the two summits.
Given that further meetings are no longer needed, it is very likely to see both men using the breakdown of the Hanoi summit as a way to reorient their foreign policies toward one that helps them achieve their next objectives. The fact that they can both portray the other side as being uncooperative and unwilling to compromise to achieve lasting peace provide both with the needed fodder to pander to their respective nationalistic elements at home, without seeming to betray whatever bilateral goodwill built from the two summits.
And pander to national interests they both will to face down nationalist elements that called the summits a waste of time to begin with and unable to change the fundamental relationship between the two countries and the entire dynamics surrounding the North Korean issue. Extricated from the need to continue playing publicity stunts through summitry, both Kim and Trump can now openly agree with the nationalists that, due to the other side being uncooperative, the results from the summits are minimal and they can try something more hardline in order to move the needle on outstanding issues.
The world is bound to be worse off when both Kim and Trump start moving together with their respective nationalist elements. On the US side, the precedent is already there. When Trump pulled out of Obama-era agreements with Iran, he signaled that the US government reserves the right to pull out of any signed deals that no longer feels like a good deal later. The uncertainty associated with whether Trump will stick to any terms means that anything concrete that came out of Singapore and Hanoi meetings, however trivial, can be overturned, resulting in a return to the pre-summit hostilities.
On the Kim side, Trump's unwillingness to compromise in Hanoi provides the perfect excuse to double down on its "self-reliance" strategy underpinned by hostility toward the US. US's uncompromising attitude in Hanoi becomes the centerpiece for continuing the discourse on American efforts to prevent North Korean development as the central reason behind the country's economic struggles. With the discourse validated, Kim can then focus both on cementing his larger-than-life image at home as being capable of moving the country forward despite continued American hostility.
The outcome is likely a renewed battle of words between the two men and the two governments. Yet, it should not be seen as a failure of the two bilateral meetings, but the changing circumstances associated with their successful conclusions, seen from the domestic agenda of the two leaders. Now that the summits are over, the two are ready to focus more on those dissatisfied with the summits and more ready for confrontation. As Kim and Trump acquiesce with the demands for confrontation, it is lasting peace, the original goal of the summits, that will be sacrificed.
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