A few days ago, Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo passed away in China, after lack of in-game treatment for cancer that developed unchecked during years of house arrest. The fact that Liu was gravely ill was not unannounced by the CCP (and thus not known to the international community) until treatment would have been too late. In supposedly compromising moves at the last minute, the CCP invited foreign doctors to go to China to help with treatment of Liu, an act that was seen as more symbolic than practical.
The way with which Liu was treated by the Chinese authorities mirror the enigmatic and horrifying treatments the likes of Chen Guangcheng, Falun Gong, and many other minor opponents to the authorities received in China in the past years and decades. All were dealt in ways that have rallied Anti-China elements both within China and abroad, greatly increasing hostility toward the CCP in ways that are both exaggerated and distorting of the truths on the ground.
To put simply, all these events, including that of Liu's death recently, have been complete public relations disasters for the CCP. In their heavy-handed dealings with perceived opponents, the CCP only managed to achieve the opposite: making the supporters of the said dissidents stronger by giving them free publicity. As a result, they are able to attract more supporters (who more often than not, had no idea who they were before CCP publicly acted against them) and more importantly, attract funding from foreign sources.
And there is no doubt that for many of these dissidents, foreign funding for their continued actions against the CCP is a deal they cannot refuse. The case of Liu is a case in point. I have no doubt that Liu wanted the best for the country, putting together a plan that would peacefully provide the general populace with a greater voice in governance of the country without bloodshed, and indeed, continued participation of the CCP in democratic politics, unpunished for previous deeds and as a dignified political force.
But once foreign money gets involved in the process, Liu's intentions, however pure they originally were, can no longer be interpreted as such. For political and economic reasons, many state-level and private actors abroad would love to see the worst possible scenario for China's future development, ensuring the collapse of the political entity and society as a whole. For them, only keeping China poor and divided would ensure that it does not potentially become a threat to their ideologies and business interests.
Of course, such is not the intention of Liu, or any other Chinese dissidents that came before him. But the fact that some dissidents choose to work with foreign funders mean that they are forced to change their tones, in practice becoming agents inciting regime change and generating social instability within China. At this point, it makes complete sense for the CCP to take the measure of complete hostility toward these dissidents, as they no longer side with the interests of a prosperous China, authoritarian or democratic.
Yet, the whole situation could be avoided if the CCP does not push the dissidents to the embrace of foreign funders and supporters in the first place. When a prominent dissident like Liu passes away, public opinions toward China are further turned toward the negative, and support for those who seek to incite destructive regime change within China becomes stronger. In essence, any heavy-handedness exhibited by the CCP in attempts to preserve its authority ends up weakening it.
The strategy for the CCP, instead, should be one of methodological patience. Ignoring the demands of dissidents while keeping them free would often work quite well. The closest the CCP has in success on this front has been with the Uighur separatists. By systematically choosing not to engage and be completely silent about them in media outlets, the CCP has ensured their voices stay relatively unnoticed in Western public opinion. The lack of knowledge toward Uighur demands ensure Foreigners seeking the worst for China do not have enough incentives to openly engage and fund them.
In the wakes of public relations disaster of Liu Xiaobo's death, the CCP should seek a completely new way to handle dissidents. Contrary to what the authorities might think, brutal suppression only serve to weaken the authorities. However, if they are ignored systematically, left languishing unknown to the public, then their threats to the authorities would be minimized. By avoiding public relations issues with dissidents, the CCP would be in much stronger political position.
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