The "Political Solution" of National Disunity
With the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) inching toward Baghdad, taking valuable oil assets and key cities in the process, the Obama Administration's decision, for now, to clearly rule out direct military assistance to the Iraqi government reflect a long-held sense of dismay among both American politicians and people toward the increasingly volatile situation in that part of the Middle East. As someone who remained skeptical of the US war effort in Iraq ever since its very inception years ago, the author, perhaps among many others, now sense the coming of renewed chaos in the region through creation of new divisive actors.
The problem ultimately lies with the emergence of a power vacuum. The decreasing attempt of the US to hold Iraq's differing interest groups together through military force has allowed regionalistic forces to vie for control of important resources, with the Iraqi Army not preventing the disunity but becoming one of the actors fighting for a piece of the pie. Everyone, from the Kurds now asserting independence and expending their territorial control, to the various political allies of the Maliki government fighting for religious agendas, are proving Baghdad to have little tacit in balancing different interest groups.
While it is unfair to blame the Obama Administration's decision to quickly decrease military presence as the root cause of the ongoing chaos, it is hard to simply ignore American actions (or lack thereof) that is exacerbating internal divisions that threaten to topple Iraq as a unified country. For one, America's war of ideology with Islamists on the secularization of Iraq has obviously not endeared the local populace in the same way that similar efforts by Saddam only suppressed but did not eradicate reasons for communal antagonism. The failure of inclusive democracy in Iraq has only strengthened the Islamist alternative.
Under this context, it is quite ironic that the Obama Administration has so focused on the idea of resolving the current issue through only what it deems to be "political solutions." The failure of the US military to stamp out fundamentalist fervor in Iraq, combined with the utter failure of its liberal internationalist vision as something that can be solidly transplanted into the Middle East, has given Washington only the worst possible non-military choices to halt the advance of the ISIS and protect a fragile democratic order in Baghdad. Cooperation with the likes of Iran and strengthening of Shi'ite militias are now favorable.
The result of these half-baked political solutions is none other than the rapid disappearance of the politically moderate Muslim. To protect its members, each of these moderate groups is now forced to take up arms, knowing that the democratic structure that they worked hard to protect and entrench. As they battle with more radical forces, they are forced to turn to more radical tactics and ideologies, both to accommodate for the sheer brutality of the battlefield and rally, through increasingly fanatical and hot-blooded propaganda, a demoralized peace-desiring populace to support their war efforts with manpower and materials.
With disappearance of the moderates, Washington's political solutions will simply become strategies to balance various radical groups in a series of proxy wars. Betting on different militias and supplying them with support at different points in time, the US will become involved just to keep all groups in a perpetually embattled and weakened state, allowing the government in Baghdad to hang on just because there is no force strong enough to dislodge it. The US's potential alliance with Shi'ite militias and Kurds against the ISIS can very much be understood as part of such a "balance-and-weaken" strategy.
In this process, the US is starting to lose the bigger picture. Why exactly is it propping up a government in Baghdad, led by a man who has done nothing but complain about America's failures and who has not gained the allegiance of the country's minority groups? Why should it really care that a radical Islamic government is taking root in northern, and perhaps eventually, all of Iraq? Plenty of people in government has already hinted the need to remove Maliki, whether or not by democratic means. The American voters are already cynical enough about the moral righteousness of the US in the Middle East quagmire.
At the end of the day, the US should count its losses and quit this tit-for-tat game between different groups. Its resources are better spent elsewhere, including here in Asia and more significantly, back at home. Sure, some national embarrassment will be suffered, but that is hardly lethal as the US has already experienced the same with fall of Saigon in 1975. And there is no guarantee that the likes of ISIS or any other successor state to Iraq will be anti-American by default. After all, with economy in tatters, any radical group governing in the region will have to tone down harsh rhetoric and threats of terrorist attacks to focus on real issues of everyday livelihood, just as Hamas is doing in Gaza.
The problem ultimately lies with the emergence of a power vacuum. The decreasing attempt of the US to hold Iraq's differing interest groups together through military force has allowed regionalistic forces to vie for control of important resources, with the Iraqi Army not preventing the disunity but becoming one of the actors fighting for a piece of the pie. Everyone, from the Kurds now asserting independence and expending their territorial control, to the various political allies of the Maliki government fighting for religious agendas, are proving Baghdad to have little tacit in balancing different interest groups.
While it is unfair to blame the Obama Administration's decision to quickly decrease military presence as the root cause of the ongoing chaos, it is hard to simply ignore American actions (or lack thereof) that is exacerbating internal divisions that threaten to topple Iraq as a unified country. For one, America's war of ideology with Islamists on the secularization of Iraq has obviously not endeared the local populace in the same way that similar efforts by Saddam only suppressed but did not eradicate reasons for communal antagonism. The failure of inclusive democracy in Iraq has only strengthened the Islamist alternative.
Under this context, it is quite ironic that the Obama Administration has so focused on the idea of resolving the current issue through only what it deems to be "political solutions." The failure of the US military to stamp out fundamentalist fervor in Iraq, combined with the utter failure of its liberal internationalist vision as something that can be solidly transplanted into the Middle East, has given Washington only the worst possible non-military choices to halt the advance of the ISIS and protect a fragile democratic order in Baghdad. Cooperation with the likes of Iran and strengthening of Shi'ite militias are now favorable.
The result of these half-baked political solutions is none other than the rapid disappearance of the politically moderate Muslim. To protect its members, each of these moderate groups is now forced to take up arms, knowing that the democratic structure that they worked hard to protect and entrench. As they battle with more radical forces, they are forced to turn to more radical tactics and ideologies, both to accommodate for the sheer brutality of the battlefield and rally, through increasingly fanatical and hot-blooded propaganda, a demoralized peace-desiring populace to support their war efforts with manpower and materials.
With disappearance of the moderates, Washington's political solutions will simply become strategies to balance various radical groups in a series of proxy wars. Betting on different militias and supplying them with support at different points in time, the US will become involved just to keep all groups in a perpetually embattled and weakened state, allowing the government in Baghdad to hang on just because there is no force strong enough to dislodge it. The US's potential alliance with Shi'ite militias and Kurds against the ISIS can very much be understood as part of such a "balance-and-weaken" strategy.
In this process, the US is starting to lose the bigger picture. Why exactly is it propping up a government in Baghdad, led by a man who has done nothing but complain about America's failures and who has not gained the allegiance of the country's minority groups? Why should it really care that a radical Islamic government is taking root in northern, and perhaps eventually, all of Iraq? Plenty of people in government has already hinted the need to remove Maliki, whether or not by democratic means. The American voters are already cynical enough about the moral righteousness of the US in the Middle East quagmire.
At the end of the day, the US should count its losses and quit this tit-for-tat game between different groups. Its resources are better spent elsewhere, including here in Asia and more significantly, back at home. Sure, some national embarrassment will be suffered, but that is hardly lethal as the US has already experienced the same with fall of Saigon in 1975. And there is no guarantee that the likes of ISIS or any other successor state to Iraq will be anti-American by default. After all, with economy in tatters, any radical group governing in the region will have to tone down harsh rhetoric and threats of terrorist attacks to focus on real issues of everyday livelihood, just as Hamas is doing in Gaza.
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