Chen Guangcheng, the Chinese Diaspora, and the Quiet Revolution of the Opinions in China
In many ways, the ongoing political confrontation with regard to the blind human rights activist Mr Chen Guangcheng is nothing new. Mr Chen, who has seen his fate tossed about by behind-the-door negotiations between Chinese and American diplomat since his daring escape to the US Embassy from years-long house arrest in his rural hometown in Shandong Province, seems to be just another figure that portrays the damning and ever-so-embarrassing situation of human rights violation in China. Yet, scratch below the surface of all the usual opinions and a new picture seems to emerge.
In the Western media, there were usual comments about Sino-American conflicts over human rights (in the same way Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Prize and Dalai Lama are), infused with certain worries about China not creating a responsible international image. But what sit this current one apart from the rest is on the Chinese side, both within and outside China, where the there has been a perceivable, and pretty much unprecedented, UNIFORM opposition to the official stance by the Chinese government on the issue. While many voiced their criticisms, no one has voiced public support for the government.
Even some official newspapers, after issuing their government-enforced "editorials" dutifully criticizing the US for manipulating China for self-interest, quietly issued unofficial apologies through quickly-censored posts on various online social networking services. A quick monitoring of both Chinese and Western blogospheres can easily see how much public opinions among Chinese citizens and diaspora are stacking against the CCP. The level of straightforwardness in the criticisms are also much unlike the hidden, coded negatives associated with previous examples of literary political dissidence.
Whats more, with regard to Mr Chen departing the US Embassy "voluntarily," rumored to have happened due to CCP's threat to beat up his family, the collective opinion of the Chinese seems to be one of indignant acceptance that a "government of political hooligans" is expected to do something of that sort. The anger instead turned toward the US government, not for their interference in Chinese domestic affairs (as the CCP proclaims) but that it has not done enough to save Mr Chen (and other dissidents) from CCP hooliganism.
There are two clear phenomena occurring here that really should scare the political elites in Beijing. The first is a clear breakdown of their systematic control of public opinion, through armies of censors mixed in with deliberate dispersal of officially accepted versions of the story. The dissenting opinions found both in English and Chinese, both inside and outside China, both among foreigners and Chinese, have reached such a high level, both in absolute volume and in ingenuity to successfully avoid censorship, that it is no longer possible for even the most sophisticated censors to find ALL of them.
The second, and more important, is a renewed acknowledgement among the Chinese citizenry that the political dissidents of China do serve some sort of constructive purpose in the future progress of the Chinese nation. They are, not as previously thought, agents of foreign meddling in Chinese affairs or mere representatives of fringe, radical interests in Chinese society. The acknowledgement is especially strong and open among the Chinese literati now living abroad, the students, researchers, and professors that are supposed to be the brightest produced by the Chinese education system.
While neither of these would symbolize the immediate establishment of any consequential movement for overthrowing the CCP, what it does symbolizes, at the least, is strong motivations for continued growth of Chinese communities both within and outside China whose main shared identity is quiet opposition to the state of political rule in China. Those early emigrants who were against the CCP from 1949 will be increasingly joined by new emigrants who just left China, collectively throwing away pride of their homelands to become total cynics in the face of harsh political reality.
The presence of a massive Chinese overseas community hostile to the Chinese government certainly cannot be seen as a positive in any way. On one hand, hostile overseas Chinese would stop being that pool of potential high-end professionals and entrepreneurs with knowledge and capital needed to sustain economic growth in China. On the other, political hostility will further increase that trend of "brain drain," with wealthy and educated Chinese citizens emigrating at fast pace. Even with political stability, the economic consequences of the hostility is serious and could potentially be lethal...
In the Western media, there were usual comments about Sino-American conflicts over human rights (in the same way Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Prize and Dalai Lama are), infused with certain worries about China not creating a responsible international image. But what sit this current one apart from the rest is on the Chinese side, both within and outside China, where the there has been a perceivable, and pretty much unprecedented, UNIFORM opposition to the official stance by the Chinese government on the issue. While many voiced their criticisms, no one has voiced public support for the government.
Even some official newspapers, after issuing their government-enforced "editorials" dutifully criticizing the US for manipulating China for self-interest, quietly issued unofficial apologies through quickly-censored posts on various online social networking services. A quick monitoring of both Chinese and Western blogospheres can easily see how much public opinions among Chinese citizens and diaspora are stacking against the CCP. The level of straightforwardness in the criticisms are also much unlike the hidden, coded negatives associated with previous examples of literary political dissidence.
Whats more, with regard to Mr Chen departing the US Embassy "voluntarily," rumored to have happened due to CCP's threat to beat up his family, the collective opinion of the Chinese seems to be one of indignant acceptance that a "government of political hooligans" is expected to do something of that sort. The anger instead turned toward the US government, not for their interference in Chinese domestic affairs (as the CCP proclaims) but that it has not done enough to save Mr Chen (and other dissidents) from CCP hooliganism.
There are two clear phenomena occurring here that really should scare the political elites in Beijing. The first is a clear breakdown of their systematic control of public opinion, through armies of censors mixed in with deliberate dispersal of officially accepted versions of the story. The dissenting opinions found both in English and Chinese, both inside and outside China, both among foreigners and Chinese, have reached such a high level, both in absolute volume and in ingenuity to successfully avoid censorship, that it is no longer possible for even the most sophisticated censors to find ALL of them.
The second, and more important, is a renewed acknowledgement among the Chinese citizenry that the political dissidents of China do serve some sort of constructive purpose in the future progress of the Chinese nation. They are, not as previously thought, agents of foreign meddling in Chinese affairs or mere representatives of fringe, radical interests in Chinese society. The acknowledgement is especially strong and open among the Chinese literati now living abroad, the students, researchers, and professors that are supposed to be the brightest produced by the Chinese education system.
While neither of these would symbolize the immediate establishment of any consequential movement for overthrowing the CCP, what it does symbolizes, at the least, is strong motivations for continued growth of Chinese communities both within and outside China whose main shared identity is quiet opposition to the state of political rule in China. Those early emigrants who were against the CCP from 1949 will be increasingly joined by new emigrants who just left China, collectively throwing away pride of their homelands to become total cynics in the face of harsh political reality.
The presence of a massive Chinese overseas community hostile to the Chinese government certainly cannot be seen as a positive in any way. On one hand, hostile overseas Chinese would stop being that pool of potential high-end professionals and entrepreneurs with knowledge and capital needed to sustain economic growth in China. On the other, political hostility will further increase that trend of "brain drain," with wealthy and educated Chinese citizens emigrating at fast pace. Even with political stability, the economic consequences of the hostility is serious and could potentially be lethal...
It'll be interesting to see if China fulfills its end of the "deal" to let Chen Guangcheng quickly take up an academic fellowship at NYU and his family to move with him. Both countries don't need their recent constructive dialogue and beginnings of a partnership of sorts to be held hostage by this issue, as monumental is it is for Chinese human rights.
ReplyDeleteUnfortunately, how Chen and his family is treated does not really say much about the overall conditions of human rights in China...he would be treated nicely (relatively speaking) because the case is now so publicized, but the same cannot be said of thousands of others who no one even in China really knows about...
ReplyDelete