Gone are the days when any analyst seeking to get a clear picture of Sino-Taiwanese relations would have to first look into the military aspect. Are the American aircraft carriers going to enter a war in case of mainland invasion, and how much advanced weaponry can the Taiwanese procure to deter the potential invasion, thankfully, are no longer the primary concerns when we address the future developments across the Taiwan Strait. Indeed, even as the PRC government continue to point thousands of missiles at the end, there has been more talks of non-violent means of resolving the decades-old "problem."
And the Taiwanese presidential election results published yesterday indicates that on that aspect of toning down the traditional militant stance, both sides are increasingly converging toward a single view. The reelection of "moderate" (at least with regard to China relations) president Ma Ying-jeou shows that the the Taiwanese public, in their current economic instability, does not have the excess energy to devote energy to a more flared-up cross-Strait relations. Questions of economic health rules the agenda, and trade, not potential war, with the mainland, is a big component.
However, for the leaders to Beijing to be simply convinced that Chinese soft power has won over the Taiwanese public, and the existing status quo would comfortably remain for at least the next four years would be a grave underestimation of Taiwanese influence on the mainland, especially at a grass-roots level. Certainly, it could be said that the Taiwanese could be more reliant on the mainland for economic stability than the other way around, but for non-economic factors, the evaluation is much murkier.
For instance, take the issue of the very process of election in Taiwan. Unprecedented in the history of China, the state-owned TV stations and state-monitored major portal websites were actually allowed to do LIVE coverage of the Taiwanese elections, with all the boisterous debates of netizens, and millions of excited commoners glued to the screen to check on the current balance among the major contenders. Add to that the presence of two million Taiwanese citizens interacting with the mainland middle class in the major urban centers of the mainland, and there forms a primitive yet all-too-functioning election atmosphere too reminiscent of similar times in places like the US.
With Chinese citizens speaking out for their favorite candidates (even though the choice is pretty much unanimous on the mainland with near 100% support for Mr. Ma), the only thing that is missing is the ability to vote. Combine that with mainland coverage of all the random election stories (e.g. conspiracy theories, celebrity endorsements, voter turnouts, the list goes on and on), and the excitement for the election on the mainland, barring actual street rallies, is not any less than what is found in Taiwan.
If such excitement does not constitute Taiwanese soft power, what else can? The systematic support for the political process (if not the views) of Taiwan demonstrated by the people (and to an extent, the government) of mainland China is unprecedented in the history of relationships between independent sovereign entities. Much as Hong Kong pop culture claimed the eyes and ears of the mainland people, the Taiwanese election culture has claimed the hearts and souls of the educated elites of the mainland.
And it is not difficult to envision that Mr. Ma, riding that wave of domestic and mainland support, will seek to take a much more "independent" stance on relations with China. Already in his victory speech, he has promised to continue the process of having Taiwan joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a FTA that includes the US and most advanced Asian economies but blatantly excludes mainland China. Facing the small country's destiny of having to rely on major powers for shield, Mr. Ma's Taiwan may secretly pick the US even for economic support.
Ultimately, what "peace" means across the Taiwan Strait would depend on how the government in Beijing responds to such undermining of CCP authority through indirect political influence and economic distancing. Certainly, gone are the rhetoric of missile tests, invasions, and wars, but for a country so deprived of suitable soft power weapons at the grass-roots level, mainland China would have a much harder time neutralizing the threat from a "war of ideas and minds." How Beijing reacts to the behavior of an emboldened reelected Mr. Ma would be the determining factor for peace or non-violent conflict in the coming years.
And the Taiwanese presidential election results published yesterday indicates that on that aspect of toning down the traditional militant stance, both sides are increasingly converging toward a single view. The reelection of "moderate" (at least with regard to China relations) president Ma Ying-jeou shows that the the Taiwanese public, in their current economic instability, does not have the excess energy to devote energy to a more flared-up cross-Strait relations. Questions of economic health rules the agenda, and trade, not potential war, with the mainland, is a big component.
However, for the leaders to Beijing to be simply convinced that Chinese soft power has won over the Taiwanese public, and the existing status quo would comfortably remain for at least the next four years would be a grave underestimation of Taiwanese influence on the mainland, especially at a grass-roots level. Certainly, it could be said that the Taiwanese could be more reliant on the mainland for economic stability than the other way around, but for non-economic factors, the evaluation is much murkier.
For instance, take the issue of the very process of election in Taiwan. Unprecedented in the history of China, the state-owned TV stations and state-monitored major portal websites were actually allowed to do LIVE coverage of the Taiwanese elections, with all the boisterous debates of netizens, and millions of excited commoners glued to the screen to check on the current balance among the major contenders. Add to that the presence of two million Taiwanese citizens interacting with the mainland middle class in the major urban centers of the mainland, and there forms a primitive yet all-too-functioning election atmosphere too reminiscent of similar times in places like the US.
With Chinese citizens speaking out for their favorite candidates (even though the choice is pretty much unanimous on the mainland with near 100% support for Mr. Ma), the only thing that is missing is the ability to vote. Combine that with mainland coverage of all the random election stories (e.g. conspiracy theories, celebrity endorsements, voter turnouts, the list goes on and on), and the excitement for the election on the mainland, barring actual street rallies, is not any less than what is found in Taiwan.
If such excitement does not constitute Taiwanese soft power, what else can? The systematic support for the political process (if not the views) of Taiwan demonstrated by the people (and to an extent, the government) of mainland China is unprecedented in the history of relationships between independent sovereign entities. Much as Hong Kong pop culture claimed the eyes and ears of the mainland people, the Taiwanese election culture has claimed the hearts and souls of the educated elites of the mainland.
And it is not difficult to envision that Mr. Ma, riding that wave of domestic and mainland support, will seek to take a much more "independent" stance on relations with China. Already in his victory speech, he has promised to continue the process of having Taiwan joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a FTA that includes the US and most advanced Asian economies but blatantly excludes mainland China. Facing the small country's destiny of having to rely on major powers for shield, Mr. Ma's Taiwan may secretly pick the US even for economic support.
Ultimately, what "peace" means across the Taiwan Strait would depend on how the government in Beijing responds to such undermining of CCP authority through indirect political influence and economic distancing. Certainly, gone are the rhetoric of missile tests, invasions, and wars, but for a country so deprived of suitable soft power weapons at the grass-roots level, mainland China would have a much harder time neutralizing the threat from a "war of ideas and minds." How Beijing reacts to the behavior of an emboldened reelected Mr. Ma would be the determining factor for peace or non-violent conflict in the coming years.
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